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Adam Smith and Roman Servitudes 
Ernest Metzger* 
Adam Smith lectured in jurisprudence during his time as Pro-
fessor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow (1752-
1764).  Jurisprudence covered private law and most of public law, 
and Smith cites generous amounts of Roman law, English law, 
and Scots law.  The lectures are known to us mainly through two 
sets of students’ notes, based on lectures given in 1762-63 and 
(probably) 1763-64 respectively1.  These lectures were part of a 
                                                                                                                                   
*  The author is grateful to have had the advice of Peter Stein and 
John Cairns in preparing this essay. 
1  The two lectures are published together in the critical edition: 
Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, 
and P. G. Stein, Oxford 1978, reprinted Indianapolis 1982.  The editors 
have assigned the title 'Report of 1762-63' to the earlier, and 'Report 
dated 1766' to the later, of the notes; references to these reports are ab-
breviated below to LJ(A) and LJ(B), respectively.  Interest in these lec-
tures is high, because the notes to LJ(A) were discovered comparatively 
recently, in 1958.  The notes to LJ(B) were discovered in 1895, and pub-
lished in Adam Smith, Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms, 
delivered in the University of Glasgow, ed. E. Cannan, Oxford 1896.  In 
addition to these two sets of notes, we possess some extracts from a stu-
dent's notes to an earlier course of Smith's lectures, perhaps given in the 
middle 1750s: R. L. Meek, New Light on Adam Smith's Glasgow Lectures 
on Jurisprudence, History of Political Economy, 8 (1976), p. 466-77  [ = R. 
L. Meek, Smith, Marx and After, London 1977, p. 81-91] ('Anderson 
Notes').  There are also some brief remarks on the lectures related by 
Dugald Stewart, professor of moral philosophy at Edinburgh, from an 
account given to him by one of Smith's pupils: Dugald Stewart, Account of 
the Life and Writings of Adam Smith, LL.D. [1793], in: Adam Smith: Es-
says on Philosphical Subjects, ed. W. P. D. Wightman, J. C. Bryce, and I. 
S. Ross, Oxford 1980, reprinted Indianapolis 1982, p. 273-76. Ernest Metzger  2 
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larger course of lectures on moral philosophy2, and presented the 
history of laws and institutions in the framework of a certain his-
torical jurisprudence.  This historical jurisprudence was not pecu-
liar to Smith; it had been used by some of his contemporaries and 
predecessors.  Montesquieu was probably the first to use it3, and 
other writers, French and Scottish, quickly took it up4.  Smith was 
one of its principal contributors5, refining the ideas and combining 
them with the ethics he had developed in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments6. 
                                                                                                                                   
2  On the content, see Stewart, Account (supra, n. 1), p. 274-75 (ac-
count of John Millar).  The moral philosophy lectures covered natural 
theology, ethics, and jurisprudence, the last of these subdivided into jus-
tice and 'political regulations founded on the principle of expediency' (= 
police, revenue, and arms).  The distinction between 'justice' and 'police, 
revenue, and arms' in Smith's thought is based on ideas developed in 
TMS, ideas which Smith presented in the lectures on ethics.  Ibid., 274.  
3 Montesquieu,  De l'esprit des lois XVIII ('Des lois, dans le rapport 
qu'elles ont avec la nature du terrain').  MacCormick has found sugges-
tions of this jurisprudence earlier, in Stair (see Viscount of Stair [James 
Dalrymple], The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, ed. D. M. Walker, 
Edinburgh 1981, p. 306-307 (at 2.1.29-32)).  N. MacCormick, Law and 
Enlightenment, in:  The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlighten-
ment, ed. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, Edinburgh 1982, p. 160-63.  
His larger point is that a belief in a rational natural law is not incom-
patible with a belief in social change.  Ibid., 160.  
4  The subject has been treated extensively in R. L. Meek, Social 
Science and the Ignoble Savage, Cambridge 1976.  Among the French 
writers after Montesquieu, Turgot is the most prominent: see Anne 
Robert Jacques Turgot, A Philosophical Review of the Successive Ad-
vances of the Human Mind, in: R. L. Meek, ed., Turgot on Progress, Soci-
ology and Economics, Cambridge 1973, p. 41-59; idem, Plan d'un ouvrage 
sur la géographie politique, in: Oeuvres de Turgot, 1, ed. G. Schelle, Paris 
1913, p. 259-60.  Among the Scottish writers, besides Smith, the most 
prominent contributors are Kames, Sir John Dalrymple of Cranstoun, 
and John Millar.  See Lord Kames [Henry Home], Historical Law-Tracts, 
2nd ed., Edinburgh 1761, p. 81-100; John Dalrymple, An Essay Towards 
a General History of Feudal Property in Great Britain, 2nd ed., London 
1758, p. 75-78 (under the title 'History of the Alienation of Land-
property'); John Millar, An Historical View of the English Government, 
London 1787, p. 27-41 (under the title 'Character and Manner of the 
Saxon'). 
5  Meek says that a good case may be made that Smith was the 
originator of the theory in its most famous form: the 'four stages theory'.  
Meek, Social Science (supra, n. 4), p. 99.  More guarded: A. S. Skinner, 
Historical Theory, in: A System of Social Science: Papers Relating to 
Adam Smith, 2nd ed., Oxford 1996, p. 98-99. 
6  For discussions of this combination of historical jurisprudence 
and morals, see P. Stein, Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea, Cam-Ernest Metzger  3 
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  This essay discusses Smith's treatment of Roman servitudes 
and the difficulties he met in bringing servitudes into his histori-
cal jurisprudence.  These difficulties are not specific to servitudes, 
but part of a wider problem affecting Smith's project.  The prob-
lem very briefly is this.  Smith was a highly learned man and en-
tirely at home in the sources of antiquity7.  But he had set himself 
the difficult task of explaining the 'causes' of laws and institu-
tions, and Roman law gave him a surfeit of information.  He 
sometimes found it difficult to accommodate the information to 
the theory.  Writers in the earlier tradition had an easier task: 
they made a two-fold division, attributing certain rules to the ex-
istence of civil authority, reserving others to the state of nature.  
Smith aspired to something more difficult and could not be so 
general in his conclusions: a civilization existed in one or another 
distinct 'age', and the historical data had to be explained causally 
with respect to each age. 
The success of Smith's historical jurisprudence has always 
been uncertain.  He hoped in his lifetime to complete a book on 
the general principles of law and government, and he probably 
intended to treat his jurisprudence more thoroughly there8.  He 
was not able to complete the book, and he directed the drafts to be 
burned before his death.  The reasons for his failure to complete 
the book are not known, and some have speculated that he met a 
serious obstacle he could not overcome9.  I suggest below that ser-
vitudes caused him to stumble, but not that the wider problem 
                                                                                                                                   
bridge 1980, p. 39-46;  K. Haakonssen, The Science of the Legislator: The 
Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith, Cambridge 
1981, chh. 5-8.  References below to The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(TMS) are to the critical edition: Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sen-
timents, ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, Oxford 1976, reprinted Indi-
anapolis 1982.  
7 See  Stewart,  Account (supra, n. 1), p. 272;  P. G. Stein, Adam 
Smith's Theory of Law and Society, in: Classical Influences on Western 
Thought, A.D. 1650-1870, ed. R. R. Bolgar, Cambridge 1979, p. 265-73; G. 
Vivenza, Adam Smith and the Classics: The Classical Heritage in Adam 
Smith's Thought, Oxford 2001, p. 1-6. 
8 His  Wealth of Nations fulfilled his goal so far as political regula-
tions were concerned, but not so far as justice was concerned.  References 
below to Wealth of Nations (WN) are to the critical edition: Adam Smith, 
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R. H. 
Campbell, A. S. Skinner, and W. B. Todd, Oxford 1976, reprinted Indian-
apolis 1981, 2 vols. 
9  See C. Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 
Cambridge 1999, p. 30-31, 256-58, and the discussion and literature cited 
in D. Winch, Adam Smith's Politics: an Essay in Historiographic Revi-
sion, Cambridge 1978, p. 12-27. Ernest Metzger  4 
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which servitudes represented was a serious obstacle.  To the con-
trary, I suggest that Smith may have recognized the problem and 
undertaken to solve it by being more selective in his use of Roman 
law sources. 
1.  —  Smith's two accounts of Roman servitudes 
The excerpts from Smith's lectures given below are very 
slightly abbreviated.  I have omitted some of the conventional por-
tions of his account10 in order to focus on what is unique: the 
proposition that servitudes originally gave rise to personal rights11. 
a)  Lectures of 1762-63 
Smith discusses servitudes under the heading of real rights.  
In this passage he gives the fullest description of his views12. 
Servitudes are burthens or claims that one man has on the 
property of another.  The Romans considered servitudes as be-
ing either real or personal; i.e. as being due by a certain per-
son or by a certain thing. . . .  It is to be observed that all ser-
vitudes were originally personall; and this will easily appear if 
we consider the manner in which they have been introduced.  
Thus to take a common instance, we shall suppose that the 
farm of one man lies betwixt the high way or the market town 
and the farm of his neighbour.  Here it will be very convenient 
if not highly necessary that the possessor of the former farm 
should have the liberty of a road thro the farm of his 
neighbour.  This he may obtain for a certain gratuity from the 
possessor; and take his obligation to grant him that liberty in 
time to come.  This would be given him not as being such a 
man but as being possessor of such a farm, and would be 
stipulated not only for him but for his heirs and successors 
likewise.  And if he should afterwards sell or dispose of his 
farm he would account that liberty as a part of his posses-
sions, and demand some reasonable compensation for it from 
the purchaser as well as for the farm itself.—But let us sup-
pose that the proprietor of the servient farm should dispose of 
his farm, and that he should according to agreement with the 
                                                                                                                                   
10  LJ(A) i.17-18 gives a more conventional treatment: it is set out 
below in the text accompanying note 114, where I discuss its significance. 
11  I have reproduced the spelling and punctuation of the critical 
edition without noting where they would depart from modern conven-
tions. 
12  LJ(A) ii.14-16, 19. Ernest Metzger  5 
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owner of the dom. praed. take the purchaser bound to grant 
him the liberty stipulated; that the farm in this manner 
passes thro three or four different hands; and that the 4th 
possessor refuses to grant him the liberty stipulated.  In what 
manner shall he compel him to perform it.  He is bound in-
deed to the third possessor, but not to him, so that the dom. 
prae. dom. can have no action against him.  He can only come 
at his right by raising an action against the first possessor, to 
make him perform the obligation he had come under.  He 
again might compel the 2d, and he the third, and he the 4th; 
or he might raise an action against the 1st to oblige him to 
cede to him the obligation the 2d had come under, and then 
the 2d the 3rd and so on.  To prevent such a multiplicity of ac-
tions, which would often be very troublesome, it came to be 
enacted by actio servitia [sc. actio Serviana], and afterwards 
by the actio quasi servit. [sc. actio quasi-Serviana], first that 
some and afterwards that the greater part of servitudes 
should be considered as real rights. 
. . .  
All burthens on property, as they can only have taken their 
rise from a contract, must originally have been personall, as 
was said, for a contract can produce nothing but a personall 
right.  They became real only by the intervention of the law. 
He goes on to discuss other real rights, and concludes:13 
I have now considered the severall real rights, not only prop-
erty but also servitudes and pledges, and shown that these 
were originally merely personall rights, tho by the determina-
tion of the legislature, to prevent the confusion this was found 
to produce, they were afterwards changed into real rights. 
b)  Lectures of 1763-64 
In this set of lectures, some of the relevant discussion falls at 
the very beginning, by way of introduction to the lectures as a 
whole.14 
Servitudes are burthens upon the property of another.  Thus I 
may have a liberty of passing thro' a field belonging to an-
other which lyes between me and the high way, or if my 
neighbour have plenty of water in his fields and I have none 
                                                                                                                                   
13 LJ(A)  ii.37. 
14 LJ(B)  9. Ernest Metzger  6 
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in mine for my cattle, I may have a right to drive them to his.  
Such burthens on the property of another are called servi-
tudes.  These rights were originally personal, but the trouble 
and expence of numerous lawsuits in order to get possession of 
them, when the adjacent property which was burthened with 
them passed thro' a number of hands, induced legislators to 
make them real, and claimable a quocumque possessore.  Af-
terwards the property was transferred with these servitudes 
upon it.  
Further on is a fuller discussion, corresponding to the first of the 
quoted passages from the earlier lectures:15 
The second species of real rights is servitudes, or burthens 
which one man has on the property of another.  These rights 
were at first personal, as they were entered into by a contract 
between the persons.  It is necessary that I should have a road 
to the market town.  If a man's estate lye between me and it, I 
must bargain with him for the priviledge of a road thro' it.  
This contract produces only a personal right, tho' I should 
bind him not to sell this estate without the burthen.  But here 
was an inconveniencey, for if the land were sold and the new 
proprietor refused the road, I could not sue him on a personal 
right upon the former proprietor.  Before I can come at the 
new purchaser I must pursue the person from whom I had the 
right, who must pursue him to whom he sold it.  If the land 
has gone thro' several hands this is very tedious and incon-
venient.  The law, to remedy this, made servitudes real rights, 
demandable a quocumque possessore. . . .  [Servitudes] are all 
naturaly personal rights and are only made real by lawyers. 
2.  —  A modern critique 
To the proposition that servitudes originally gave rise to per-
sonal rights, a modern reader would probably respond as follows. 
  (1)  It is hazardous to speculate about the real or personal 
character of rights in early Rome16.  In the classical law, where 
litigation was carried out with clear, written pleadings and where 
a substantial juristic literature helps us to distinguish one claim 
from another, distinctions such as 'real' and 'personal' are rela-
                                                                                                                                   
15 LJ(B)  172. 
16  I pass over the question whether it is correct to speak of 'rights' 
at all in early (or classical) Rome.  See H. F. Jolowicz, Roman Founda-
tions of Modern Law, Oxford 1957, p. 73.  It almost certainly is not, but 
the point is not relevant to the present discussion. Ernest Metzger  7 
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tively easy to identify17.  But in the pre-classical law, where in-
formation is limited and strict legal forms dominated in both 
transactions and litigation, the modern reader tends to rely heav-
ily on the forms, and does not leap to characterize an institution 
as real or personal without evidence.  To understand what charac-
ter a servitude assumed in the earliest law, a modern reader 
would consider, e.g., how servitudes were created, extinguished, 
or enforced18. 
  (2)  The view that Roman predial servitudes (the focus of 
Smith's discussion) were originally personal in nature, but were 
then made real by law, is an eccentric view19.  The modern view is 
the very opposite, that predial servitudes, if anything, were his-
torically even more profoundly tied to the property that was their 
object.  The four original servitudes (iter, actus, via, aquae ductus) 
were  res mancipi and transferred by mancipatio: this suggests 
that ownership of a servitude was originally regarded as the own-
ership of a corporeal thing (a patch of earth, a spring), the owner-
ship being shared in some respect between the persons involved20.  
Watson says: 'It seems now to be completely accepted that the 
four original servitudes were in early law regarded in some way 
as involving ownership over the objects of the servitudes.'21 
    (3)  The Servian action and the quasi-Servian action are 
miscited by Smith22.  These actions relate to pledge and hypothec: 
the Servian permitted the landlord of an agricultural tenant to 
                                                                                                                                   
17  See W. W. Buckland and A. D. McNair, Roman Law and Com-
mon Law: A Comparison in Outline, 2nd ed. rev. F. H. Lawson, Cam-
bridge 1952, p. 89 (the distinction between iura in rem and iura in per-
sonam is 'clearly expressed throughout the Roman system'.).  In the 
formulae for actions claiming or denying servitudes, the nature of the 
right is always clear: ius esse or ius non esse.  See D. Mantovani, Le For-
mule del Processo Privato Romano, 2nd ed., Padova 1999, p. 41-44.   
18  In this respect Smith was at a disadvantage, not having the 
benefit of Gaius' Institutes and in particular Gaius' discussion of the legis 
actio procedure.  On the remedies for enforcement of ancient servitudes, 
see M. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht, 1, 2nd ed., Munich 1971, p. 143; 
cf. G. Diósdi, Ownership in Ancient and Preclassical Roman Law, Buda-
pest 1970, p. 115 (discussing the inadequacy of the legis actio sacramento 
in rem for protecting ancient servitudes).   
19  But see below notes 138 to 144 and accompanying text. 
20 M.  Talamanca,  Istituzioni di Diritto Romano, Milan 1990, p. 456-
57; Kaser, Privatrecht, 1 (supra, n. 18), p. 143; A. Watson, The Law of 
Property in the Later Roman Republic, Oxford 1968, p. 184; H. F. Jolowicz 
and B. Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 3rd 
ed., Cambridge 1972, p. 158. 
21 Watson,  The Law of Property (supra, n. 20), p. 184. 
22  As noted by the editors: see LJ(A), p. 77 n.83. Ernest Metzger  8 
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recover pledged property from third persons, while the quasi-
Servian extended the protection, eventually to cover all property 
under hypothec23.  Neither action has anything to do with servi-
tudes. 
  From the above, we might conclude that Smith did not intend 
what he expressed, but committed an error.  We might, for exam-
ple, conclude that Smith's misunderstanding of the Servian and 
quasi-Servian actions led him to attribute to servitudes what is 
true only of pledge and hypothec.  I do not believe this is what 
Smith has done, however.  The references to the Servian and 
quasi-Servian actions are of course wrong but, as I suggest below, 
their appearance here is probably the result of Smith misremem-
bering his source, rather than a conscious error on his part24.  A 
second possibility is that Smith somehow missed the nuance of 
'real servitude' and 'personal servitude', and became confused25.  
This possibility is supported by a sentence in LJ(A) ii.14, quoted 
above, where Smith says that servitudes are 'either real or per-
sonal; i.e. as being due by a certain person or by a certain thing'.  
But again, I do not believe Smith has fallen into this trap either.  
Further on in this lecture he shows that he understands entirely 
the nuance of the phrase 'real servitude': 'A real servitude, servi-
tus realis, is not a servitude upon a certain thing, for all servi-
tudes are due in that manner, but a servitude which is due to a 
person not as being such an one but as being the owner of such a 
farm; it is said to be due to such a thing.'26  Several works familiar 
to Smith also make the distinction between real and personal ser-
vitudes very clear, and it is hard to believe he was not aware of 
it27.  That in one place the text reads 'due by' rather than 'due to' 
is probably a slip, either Smith's or the note-taker's. 
                                                                                                                                   
23 J.  Inst. 4.6.7, 31; D.20.1.10, h.t.21.3, 20.6.4 (Ulpian 73 ed.); 
D.13.7.28 pr. (Julian 11 dig.); D.16.1.13.1 (Gaius 9 ed. prov.).  
24  It might be useful here to mention that in LJ(B) 174 there is a 
somewhat misleading abbreviation by the note-taker.  Smith here refers 
to the ability of a landlord to claim the stock of his tenant from any pos-
sessor, and because the reference is introduced by the word 'anciently', 
this might be taken as a reference to the actio Serviana.  However, a 
comparison with the corresponding passage in the earlier notes, LJ(A) 
ii.24, shows that he is speaking of Scots law. 
25  Perhaps on reading D.8.5.2 pr. (Ulpian 17 ed.): De servitutibus in 
rem actiones conpetunt nobis ad exemplum earum quae ad usum fructum 
pertinent. 
26  LJ(A) ii.52 (emphasis added).  See also LJ(A) ii.37-38, where 
Smith takes pains to distinguish an 'exclusive privilege' from a servitude 
which, judging by context, is probably a personal servitude.  
27  See especially Pufendorf, De officio hominis et civis 1.12.8; Ger-
schom Carmichael, Supplementa et Observationes ad Clarissimi Viri Ernest Metzger  9 
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  Smith's theory of the origin of servitudes, I argue, was con-
scious and deliberate.  We can identify some of the sources for this 
theory fairly confidently, and we can also speculate on the reasons 
why he adopted this theory.  Before discussing these matters I 
give short description of Smith's historical jurisprudence.  
3.  —  Smith's historical jurisprudence 
Smith's historical jurisprudence is based on the idea that a 
civilization provides for its subsistence in a certain way, and that 
the way it does so provokes the creation of certain legal ideas.  
This jurisprudence is part of a larger historical theory, according 
to which a civilization progresses from one mode of subsistence to 
another—one 'age' to another—with each age giving rise to cer-
tain characteristics28.  In Wealth of Nations, for example, he 
writes about how the demands of defence are met differently in 
different ages, how different ages administer justice, and how di-
                                                                                                                                   
Samuelis Pufendorfii Libros Duos De Officio Hominis et Civis, Glasgow 
1718, p. 142;  Francis Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to Moral Philoso-
phy, Glasgow 1747, p. 169; idem, A System of Moral Philosophy, 1, Lon-
don 1755, p. 351.  Similarly, Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, Elementa juris 
civilis secundum ordinem Institutionum, 6th ed., Leiden 1751, § 392. 
28  Smith's remarks on the ages of civilisation are included in many 
places in his works; some of the more extended treatments may be found 
in: LJ(A) i.26-35, iv.1-40; LJ(B) 19-30, 149-151; WN V.i.a-b.17; Meek, ed., 
Anderson Notes (supra, n. 1), p. 467-68.  There are also some brief re-
marks on the ages of civilization and division of labour in a fragment of 
Smith's own notes from the 1760s: Adam Smith, First Fragment on the 
Division of Labour, in: Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. R. L. 
Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P. G. Stein, Oxford 1978, reprinted Indianapo-
lis 1982, p. 583-84.  The subject has been discussed a great deal.  Meek 
discusses in detail the development of these ideas over several centuries 
in Meek, Social Science (supra, n. 4).  Some of his account is challenged in 
P. Stein, The Four Stage Theory of the Development of Societies, in: The 
Character and Influence of the Roman Civil Law: Historical Essays, Lon-
don 1988, p. 395-409.  Haakonssen discusses Smith's historical jurispru-
dence with special attention to Smith's projected corpus.  Haakonssen, 
Science ( supra, n. 6), p. 154-77.  Other treatments may be found in: 
Campbell, et al., edd., General Introduction, in: Wealth of Nations (supra, 
n. 8), p. 11-18; Skinner, Historical Theory ( supra, n. 5), p. 76-105; P. 
Stein, Adam Smith's Jurisprudence—Between Morality and Economics, 
in: Jubilee Lectures Celebrating the Foundation of the Faculty of Law, 
University of Birmingham, London 1981, p. 142-52; idem, Legal Evolu-
tion: The Story of an Idea, Cambridge 1980, p. 29-46.  A good popular 
treatment is J. Z. Muller, Adam Smith in His Time and Ours, Princeton 
1993, p. 117-25. Ernest Metzger  10 
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vision of labour differs from age to age29.  These ideas are less pol-
ished in the jurisprudence lectures, though the general scheme is 
the same: a civilization exists in a certain age, exhibiting legal 
ideas which are in some way appropriate to that age. 
Smith does not argue that a civilization necessarily progresses 
through these ages, or progresses in a certain order30.  How far 
Smith believed these ages determined the lives of those who lived 
in them is nevertheless a matter of debate31.  So far as the law is 
concerned, the better view is that Smith believed certain ages 
tended to produce certain laws, but many other influences were at 
work as well32, and in any event individuals always retain the 
power to make decisions about the law33.  Smith's scheme is there-
fore 'determinative' of the law only in the sense that a given legal 
idea would not arrive until a given age, and it is 'progressive' only 
in the sense that some legal ideas remain and continue to be used 
in subsequent ages.  His historical jurisprudence is therefore not 
based on the proposition that certain laws are peculiar to certain 
ages, or that certain ages necessarily produce certain laws, or that 
laws undergo a certain evolution.  It is instead a kind of genetic 
theory, which attempts to explain the origins—some of the ori-
gins—of a selection of legal ideas by reference to mode of subsis-
                                                                                                                                   
29  See, respectively, WN V.i.a.1-15, V.i.b.1-17, V.i.f.50-51. 
30 See  Skinner,  Historical Theory (supra, n. 5), p. 82-83. 
31  Discussed in J. Salter, Adam Smith on Feudalism, Commerce 
and Slavery, History of Political Thought, 13 (1992), p. 219-24.  Salter 
argues that Smith's account of progress is indeed materialistic to a de-
gree, but it is not so determined an account as to leave no room for nor-
mative laws. 
32 Haakonssen,  Science (supra, n. 6), p. 185-89. 
33  Ibid., p. 186 ('. . . although in our social and historical explana-
tions we shall often be unable to point out the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of events, we shall yet be able to make these events intelligible 
by pointing out some of the more or less necessary conditions.'); Stein, 
Adam Smith's Jurisprudence (supra, n. 28), p. 151-52, and especially 152 
('Starting from a desire to distinguish what a man can be compelled to do 
from what he ought to do, he was led to the position that what a man can 
be compelled to do depends on the economic state of the society in which 
he lives.'); A. Fitzgibbons, Adam Smith's System of Liberty, Wealth, and 
Virtue, Oxford 1995, p. 126 ('Smith's theory of history indicated not an 
inevitable economic fate, but the need for moral choice.'); N. MacCormick, 
Adam Smith on Law, in: K. Haakonssen, ed., Adam Smith, Aldershot 
1998, p. 200-203, and especially 202 ('The more we know and understand 
of our own circumstances, the more we can make genuinely rational 
choices guided by a well-founded view of individual or of collective inter-
ests.').  Cf. J. Crospey, Polity and Economy, rev. ed., South Bend 2001, p. 
68-69 ('. . . the element of rational choice in the process of social evolution 
is precisely what Smith denies.'). Ernest Metzger  11 
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tence.  That only a selection of ideas is explained in this way re-
quires a brief explanation of Smith's moral theory34. 
Smith accepted that people feel a sense of obligation to do or 
to refrain from certain acts, and he set out to explain how people 
come to acquire that sense of obligation.  He argued that, though 
people in different times and places arrive at different moral 
judgments, the mechanism by which they arrive at those judg-
ments is the same.  The mechanism, which Smith explored at 
length, relies heavily on the idea that people spontaneously ex-
perience a fellow-feeling or 'sympathy' with other people.  When 
they see someone doing something (good or bad) to another per-
son, they spontaneously imagine themselves doing it, and sponta-
neously weigh the propriety of the act.  Similarly, they spontane-
ously imagine themselves the object of the act, and consider how 
they would feel about it.  They then come to a judgment about 
whether the act should be answered by punishment, reward, or 
indifference.  Their judgment, however, is not based on fixed cri-
teria or their own idiosyncratic feelings, but rather on the experi-
ence of having lived in society and having been themselves the 
object of others' sympathetic observations.  Each person who has 
himself been an object of these observations has thereby received 
certain ideas of expected behaviour and from them created a sec-
ond self, which Smith called an impartial spectator.  The impar-
tial spectator judges others' behaviour on the person's behalf, so to 
speak, and communicates his judgment to the person.  This is 
Smith's moral theory at its briefest.  For present purposes the 
most important points to take away are that (1) spectator-
sympathy may vary considerably over time and place—only the 
mechanism for making judgments stays the same; and (2) certain 
injuries tend to be felt more keenly, and refraining from these in-
juries falls within the ambit of justice. 
History (and particularly mode of subsistence) sometimes 
plays a role in moral judgment.  This is because what members of 
a community regard as an injustice depends on how spectator-
sympathy directs them, and spectator-sympathy sometimes varies 
with the circumstances of the spectator.  The way in which a 
community finds its subsistence alters spectator-sympathy in 
clear and observable ways, and therefore provides Smith with a 
framework for explaining why certain historical ages produce cer-
                                                                                                                                   
34  The following account is my own; many good accounts are avail-
able.  For concise discussions see D. D. Raphael, Adam Smith, in: Con-
cepts of Justice, Oxford 2001, p. 113-25; K. Haakonssen, Introduction, in: 
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. K. Haakonssen, Cam-
bridge 2002, p. vii-xxi.  For a longer, recent discussion see J. R. Otteson, 
Adam Smith's Marketplace of Life, Cambridge 2002, chs. 1-2. Ernest Metzger  12 
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tain laws.  Not every injustice, however, is so variable: there are 
some injustices which the spectator feels so consistently that the 
prohibition against them becomes, incidentally, a universal, or as 
close to a universal as Smith's system is capable of creating.  This 
is why Smith's ages of civilization explain the genesis of some le-
gal ideas, but not all. 
The ages of civilization are: the Age of Hunters, the Age of 
Shepherds, the Age of Agriculture, and the Age of Commerce.  The 
last of these is not relevant to this essay and, in fact, presents 
unique problems that prevent any simple summary35.  The first 
three are summarized below. 
The Age of Hunters.  Those who live in this age sustain them-
selves by collecting wild fruit, catching wild animals, and fish-
ing36.  The idea of 'property' in any exclusive sense is almost un-
known37.  The inhabitants possess the items they have caught or 
collected, and if someone were to take an item directly from an-
other's physical possession, the inhabitants would see the act as a 
transgression.  But taking something that is not in a person's 
physical possession is not seen as a transgression, though it might 
cause annoyance to one who formerly possessed the item or an-
ticipated possessing it.  In this age, therefore, 'property' extends 
no further than possession38.  Moreover, there is nothing at this 
time that one could call 'government'39.  
The Age of Shepherds.  Smith regards the step between the 
Age of Hunters and this age to be the 'greatest in the progress of 
society'40 because the notion of property is no longer limited to 
possession.  The change comes about because, with increasing 
population, the people who lived by hunting, etc., are forced to 
make more careful provision for their sustenance.  This leads 
them to store goods and eventually to keep and tame animals41.  
These are items of property which cannot always be in one's im-
mediate possession.  The inhabitants therefore naturally come to 
regard it as a transgression for a person to take an item to which 
another person has established some connection, even when that 
                                                                                                                                   
35  See especially Salter, Feudalism, Commerce and Slavery (supra, 
n. 31), p. 219-24. 
36  LJ(A) i.27-28; LJ(B) 149. 
37  LJ(A) i.44; LJ(B) 150; WN V.i.b.2. 
38  LJ(A) i.41-44, iv.19, 22; LJ(B) 149-150.  See also Meek, ed., 
Anderson Notes, (supra, n. 1), p. 467 (a similar point, but the significance 
of 'immediate possession' is not made out).  
39  LJ(A) iv.4, 6-7, 19; LJ(B) 19-20. 
40 LJ(A)  ii.97. 
41  LJ(A) i.28, 44-45; LJ(B) 20, 149. Ernest Metzger  13 
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item is not in that person's possession42.  In short, property in 
movables is recognized43. 
  The recognition of property in movables is accompanied by the 
first appearance of what may be called government44.  Executive 
power is exercised by those with large possessions45, and there is 
little or no legislative power46.  The judicial power is especially 
noteworthy, because it develops in significant ways over this pe-
riod of time.  The main point is that, with the recognition of prop-
erty, disputes multiply, and this affects the nature of the tribu-
nals.  In the beginning the judicial power is exercised by an 
assembly of the whole people and there are relatively few causes 
for disputes47.  But in time, the number of disputes increases and 
the judicial power is assumed by certain individuals48.  In fact, 
quite soon after the beginning of this age, agreements of various 
kinds appear: at first, agreements do not sustain any action49 but 
in time testaments, marriage agreements, and other agreements 
concerning property appear50.  Exactly how many of these dis-
putes are heard by the tribunals is not clear from Smith's account: 
the tribunals exist because disputes exist, but Smith does say that 
'for some time' the judicial power was limited 'with regard to the 
private affairs of individualls'51. 
  The Age of Agriculture.  The hallmark of this age is the recog-
nition of property in land52, but it does not come about right away.  
The benefits of agriculture itself come to a people's attention when 
they find it difficult to sustain themselves by herds and flocks 
alone, and when they observe that seeds produce plants similar to 
the plants that bore them53.  The land they tended would at first 
be held in common, but as individuals begin to make their home 
in fixed places and collect into cities, the fields they cultivated 
would lie most contiguous to their respective homes.  Then, the 
                                                                                                                                   
42 LJ(A)  i.45. 
43  LJ(A) i.45-46, iv.43; LJ(B) 150-151; Meek, ed., Anderson Notes 
(supra, n. 1), 467. 
44  LJ(A) iv.21; LJ(B) 20. 
45  LJ(A) iv.13-14; LJ(B) 20-21. 
46  LJ(A) iv.14-15, 18; LJ(B) 22-23. 
47  LJ(A) iv.9-10; LJ(B) 22. 
48  LJ(A) iv.15-16, 30-31, 34; LJ(B) 26 
49 LJ(A)  iv.10. 
50  LJ(A) iv.15, 23; LJ(B) 25. 
51  LJ(A) iv.25; similarly, LJ(A) iv.30; LJ(B) 23-24. 
52  LJ(A) i.51, iv.35; LJ(B) 151; Meek, ed., Anderson Notes (supra, n. 
1), p. 467.  Similarly, Kames, Historical Law-Tracts (supra, n. 4), p. 95; 
Dalrymple, General History (supra, n. 4), p. 77. 
53  LJ(A) i.30-31; LJ(B) 149. Ernest Metzger  14 
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leaders of these communities would assign portions of land to in-
dividuals and families54. 
Smith's moral theory and historical jurisprudence were an in-
novation to the course of Glasgow lectures he inherited, but were 
nevertheless adaptable to the subject.  An earlier holder of 
Smith's chair, Gershom Carmichael (1672-1729), had selected 
Pufendorf's De officio hominis et civis for use in the 'moral phi-
losophy' portion of the lectures55, and Pufendorf's distinction be-
tween duties owed in a 'natural state' and those owed in an 'ad-
ventitious state'56 was used by Carmichael and his successors, 
                                                                                                                                   
54  LJ(A) i.50-53; LJ(B) 151.  The particular manner in which these 
assignments are made is discussed below, note 111 and accompanying 
text. 
55  Carmichael determined that moral philosophy (broadly) at Glas-
gow would consist of lectures in natural theology followed by lectures in 
moral philosophy based on natural law.  Carmichael's contributions to 
the curriculum are discussed in J. Moore and M. Silverthorne, Gershom 
Carmichael and the Natural Jurisprudence Tradition in Eighteenth-
Century Scotland, in: Wealth and Virtue. The Shaping of Political Econ-
omy in the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. I. Hont and M. Ignatieff, Cam-
bridge 1983, p. 74-76; idem, Natural Sociability and Natural Rights in 
the Moral Philosophy of Gerschom Carmichael, in: Philosophers of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, ed. V. Hope, Edinburgh 1984, p. 2; J. W. Cairns, 
Adam Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence: Their Influence on Legal Edu-
cation, in: Adam Smith: International Perspectives, ed. H. Mizuta and C. 
Sugiyama, Basingstoke 1993, p. 64-65.  For the course, Carmichael pre-
pared an edition of Pufendorf supplemented with his own extensive 
commentary.  Carmichael, Supplementa (supra, n. 27).  There is a new 
English translation of parts of Carmichael's commentary together with 
other writings: J. Moore and M. Silverthorne, edd., Natural Rights on the 
Threshold of the Scottish Enlightenment: The Writings of Gershom Car-
michael, Indianapolis 2002.  In the preface to his edition of Pufendorf, 
Carmichael explains at length his adoption of natural law as the proper 
basis of moral philosophy.  This preface is translated and included in the 
new edition, ibid., p. 9-20.  Pufendorf's natural law continued to influence 
the Glasgow moral philosophy lectures of Carmichael's successor, Francis 
Hutcheson (1694-1746), as well as of Smith, a later holder of the chair.  
See Cairns, Adam Smith's Lectures, p. 80 n.31; P. Stein, From Pufendorf 
to Adam Smith: The Natural Law Tradition in Scotland, in: The Charac-
ter and Influence of the Roman Civil Law, London 1988, p. 381-93. 
56  According to Pufendorf, when mankind lived in a natural state, 
each man was answerable only to God, not to one another.  See De officio 
hominis et civis 2.1.5, 8.  Nothing belonged to one person any more than 
to another.  Ibid., 1.12.2.  In time, items in lesser abundance come to be 
divided, with agreements (sometimes tacit) used to divide ownership.   
The duties created by these agreements are adventitious, which is to say, 
'man-made'.  This progress from so-called 'negative' to 'positive' commu-
nity is described in ibid., 1.12.2, 4; idem, De jure naturae et gentium Ernest Metzger  15 
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including Smith.  Carmichael had inverted Pufendorf's 'duties' 
into natural and adventitious rights57, a scheme continued by 
Hutcheson, and Smith did not need to disturb the categories; he 
simply gave them new meanings58.  As discussed above, to Smith 
human nature reckons all rights by the same mechanism.  Accord-
ingly, the psychological forces which determine the content of any 
right is the same, whether the right is natural or adventitious.  
What varies is the certainty of the content.  Man's psychology, for 
whatever reason, consistently recognizes certain rights as compel-
ling; these are 'natural'.  Other rights may be no less compelling, 
and their violation no less unjust, but their content is not so cer-
tain because circumstances alter it; these are 'adventitious'.  The 
distinction itself is perhaps not very important in Smith's juris-
prudence59, but the really striking thing is what Smith has done 
with these ordinary categories.  A person who came to hear or 
read Smith's treatment for the first time would probably have as-
sumed that natural rights deserved and would receive the lion's 
share of attention for being natural and, so to speak, scientific, 
the other rights being merely 'man-made'.  But Smith announces 
instead that he will make a scientific study of the man-made 
rights: a close study of their history can reveal some of their 
causes, in the same way one uncovers causes in the physical sci-
ences.  This must have been quite a surprising change of empha-
sis, and of course signalled Smith's break with his Glasgow prede-
cessors. 
4.  —  Model rights and historical rights 
I argue below that Smith had difficulty fitting the law of ser-
vitudes into his historical jurisprudence, or more specifically, that 
he had difficulty explaining its genesis.  To make the argument 
clear I must say something further about Smith's treatment of 
                                                                                                                                   
4.4.14.  See also S. Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property, Ox-
ford 1991, p. 97-100; J. Kilcullen and J. Scott, A Translation of William of 
Ockham's Work of Ninety Days, New York 2001, p. 917-20 (Appendix 2: 
'The Origin of Property: Ockham, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Some Others').  
The last cited essay discusses at length the antecedents to Pufendorf's 
theory of property.     
57  See Moore and Silverthorne, Natural Sociability (supra, n. 55), 
p. 6-8. 
58  See K. Haakonssen, Adam Smith Out of Context: His Theory of 
Rights in Prussian Perspective, in: Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, 
Cambridge 1996, p. 130-34; idem, Science (supra, n. 6), p. 100-103. 
59  Haakonssen suggests the distinction was used by Smith to em-
phasize to his students that some rights are more dependent on history 
than others.  Haakonssen, Science (supra, n. 6), p. 102. Ernest Metzger  16 
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rights.  His jurisprudence, as just discussed, is a historical ac-
count of the development of rights, but in his account a right can 
be two very different things, and the distinction is important for 
purposes of the present discussion.  He can speak of a right (such 
as a property right or a contractual right) in a general way, ab-
stracted from any legal system, as in the statement 'Private prop-
erty in land never begins till a division be made from common 
agreement . . . .'60  But he can also speak of a right historically, 
that is, a right as it actually exists or existed in a given legal sys-
tem: 'By the civil law the first promises that sustained action were 
those entered into in presence of a court . . . .'61  The first, 'ab-
stracted' right is a kind of model: whether a person possesses a 
right of this kind depends on whether the right corresponds to an 
'injury', as defined in Smith's theory of morals.  Certain injuries 
(and therefore rights) are good for all time (natural), because 
spectator-sympathy always recognizes them as such, while other 
injuries depend on the circumstances (adventitious)62.  In either 
case, these model rights serve Smith's argument in two ways: (1) 
they allow Smith to speculate about the development of historical 
rights whose history is otherwise unknown, and (2) they reveal 
how some historical rights have deviated from the model63. 
  Smith begins by setting out the model rights he intends to 
discuss64.  Both courses of lectures (the second less so than the 
first65) follow to some degree an outline taken from Hutcheson, 
who himself followed an outline in the tradition of Grotius and 
Pufendorf66.  A man can be injured in three different ways: 
                                                                                                                                   
60 LJ(B)  151. 
61 LJ(B)  177. 
62  On natural and adventitious rights in Smith's system, see Haa-
konssen, Science (supra, n. 6), 100-103.  There is quite a different use of 
'natural' in Smith's works: his 'natural jurisprudence' is an attempt to set 
out principles of moral decision-making, principles which, though 'natu-
ral' and remaining the same, produce results that are to some degree his-
torically determined.  See K. Haakonssen, What Might Properly be Called 
Natural Jurisprudence?, in: K. Haakonssen, ed., Adam Smith, Aldershot 
1998, p. 176-78; Stein, Legal Evolution (supra, n. 6), p. 44-46. 
63  TMS VII.iv.36: 'In no country do the decisions of positive law co-
incide exactly, in every case, with the rules which the natural sense of 
justice would dictate.  Systems of positive law, therefore, though they 
deserve the greatest authority, as the records of the sentiments of man-
kind in different ages and nations, yet can never be regarded as accurate 
systems of the rules of natural justice.' 
64  The outline is discussed in detail in Haakonssen, Science (supra, 
n. 6), ch. 5. 
65  See Meek, ed., Anderson Notes (supra, n. 1), p. 461-66. 
66 Haakonssen,  Adam Smith Out of Context, (supra, n. 58), p. 130. Ernest Metzger  17 
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1.  as a man 
2.  as a member of a family (adventitious) 
3.  as a citizen or member of a state (adventitious) 
The first of these is subdivided further. 
1.  as a man, in one of three respects: 
a.  in his person (natural) 
b.  in his reputation (natural) 
c.  in his estate  (adventitious) 
The injuries a man may suffer 'as a man' cover much of private 
law, including injury to the body, restriction on freedom, affront to 
reputation, as well as property and contract rights.  This outline, 
though borrowed by Smith from his predecessors, fits his theory of 
morals extremely well.  The first two injuries a man may suffer as 
a man—in his person, in his reputation—are 'natural' for Smith 
as they had been for Hutcheson67.  In Smith's case, this is because 
these kinds of injuries receive a more determinate measure of 
spectator-sympathy, as Smith makes clear in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments68: 
The most sacred laws of justice, therefore, those whose viola-
tion seems to call loudest for vengeance and punishment, are 
the laws which guard the life and person of our neighbour; the 
next are those which guard his property and possessions; and 
last of all come those which guard what are called his per-
sonal rights, or what is due to him from the promises of oth-
ers. 
For example, when a man strikes another man, the quality of the 
injury is such that spectator-sympathy always recognizes it as an 
injury.  Neither 'mode of subsistence' nor, one presumes, any 
other factor, will alter the fact that an 'injury' has taken place.  It 
is 'non-contingent'69.  All of the other rights in the outline are ad-
ventitious.  They are measured by the same spectator-sympathy 
                                                                                                                                   
67 Francis  Hutcheson,  Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compen-
diaria, 2nd ed., Glasgow 1745, book 2, ch. 4; idem, System (supra, n. 27), 
book 2, ch. 5; idem, Short Introduction (supra, n. 27), p. 141-43. 
68 TMS  II.ii.2.2. 
69  This description of natural and adventitious rights in most re-
spects follows Haakonssen (supra, n. 6), p. 100-103.  I prefer 'non-
contingent' to, e.g., 'non-historical', to make clear that natural rights are 
perhaps independent not only of mode of subsistence, but non-historical 
factors as well: fortune, rank, etc.  Ernest Metzger  18 
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as the natural rights, the only difference being that the spectator, 
when placed in different circumstances, will judge the injury dif-
ferently.  Spectator-sympathy in the Age of Hunters is different 
from spectator-sympathy in the Age of Shepherds, and the inju-
ries recognized in each age will differ accordingly.  Adventitious 
rights are in this respect 'contingent'70. 
  These are what I call model rights.  The literature on Smith 
does not ordinarily distinguish model rights from historical rights, 
but I do so here, not to complicate things, but to highlight an im-
portant part of Smith's project.  Historical rights are marked by 
historical accidents and carry refinements the legal system saw fit 
to add for whatever reason.  A legal system can put a number of 
different rights under a single rubric (consider, e.g., what falls 
under Roman 'accession'), and it can classify a right in any num-
ber of unusual ways.  This means that when Smith attempts to 
classify, e.g., Roman-law rights according to his system, he cannot 
always accept the way the sources have chosen to characterize 
those rights.  He must sometimes accommodate the historical 
data to the model by looking behind the forms.  This does not de-
tract from the enterprise in any way, quite the opposite: it is a 
necessary step in demonstrating how historical rights developed, 
and it shows off Smith's critical powers71. 
 Smith's  discussion  of  hereditas—a historical right—is an ex-
ample.  Smith introduces hereditas among three other real rights 
(dominium,  servitus,  pignus)72, but tells us right away that his 
interest in it is limited.  The rights of an heir after he has entered 
into an inheritance, Smith says, are not different in quality from 
the rights of his predecessor.  But before the heir has entered into 
                                                                                                                                   
70  The question 'exactly what are they contingent on?' would return 
us to the matter of determinism, see notes 30 to 33 and accompanying 
text.  That adventitious rights are to some degree contingent on history is 
clear, but I cannot otherwise attempt to answer this question here.  
71  In two places in the earlier set of notes, there is some genuine 
ambiguity about historical and model rights.  In the first, LJ(A) i.12-13, 
Smith seems to say that a certain litany of natural rights can be 'reduced 
to the three above mentioned', ostensibly referring to the three ways a 
man may be injured 'as a man'.  If taken literally this means that the 
rights of a man in his estate are natural.  From context, however, it is 
clear that 'three' is a slip for 'two' and that 'estate' is excluded from natu-
ral rights.  In the second passage, LJ(A) i.24, however, Smith makes this 
statement: 'The only case where the origin of naturall rights is not alto-
gether plain, is in that of property.'  Haakonssen takes this as a mistake 
by the student, Haakonssen, Science (supra, n. 6), p. 205 n.10, but the 
statement is a correct one, so long as we take Smith to mean 'Some rights 
which legal systems treat as property rights are in fact natural.'  
72  LJ(A) i.19-20, ii.26-41; LJ(B) 9-10, 174-175. Ernest Metzger  19 
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the inheritance, and while he is deciding whether to accept it, this 
'real right' takes on a special character and can be reckoned what 
Smith calls an 'exclusive privilege'.  In this respect it is like a mo-
nopoly, an intellectual property right, or other 'option' granted to 
certain individuals to the exclusion of others.  Hence Smith 
chooses to speak of 'exclusive privilege', instead of hereditas, as 
the fourth category of real rights73.  At this point a reader might 
expect to find that the right of the heir, being a 'real right', is a 
right that a man enjoys 'as a man, in his estate', and is therefore 
adventitious according to the system of rights.  But this is not the 
case: though most exclusive privileges owe their existence to civil 
government and are therefore adventitious, the privilege of the 
heir who has not yet entered into the inheritance is a natural 
right.  It is analogous, according to Smith, to the right of a man 
who is pursuing a wild animal but has not yet brought it into his 
possession; another may not step in and take it74.  This is not, 
Smith insists, a breach of property, but it is an injury all the 
same75; Smith would presumably class both rights as among a 
man's (natural) right to liberty, or some other right belonging to 'a 
man, in his person'. 
  This is an example of Smith's method: he examines various 
rights as a legal system presents them, and by careful analysis 
shows what underlies the superficialities.  Historical rights are 
broken down and fitted into the model.  In the example just given, 
Smith shows how a natural right lies hidden in the Roman law of 
property. One should note, however, that it is not one of Smith's 
principal tasks to uncover natural rights and distinguish them 
from adventitious ones: he is far more concerned with adventi-
tious rights alone76.  He is particularly concerned to show in what 
respect an adventitious right is adventitious, by uncovering what 
circumstances—above all, mode of subsistence—provoked a given 
right to be recognized.  This requires him to examine the histori-
cal rights, break them down, and assign the individual parts to 
one or another historical age. 
  The best example of this is Smith's treatment of occupation.  
It is treated in both sets of lecture notes, but much more thor-
oughly in the earlier.  The various rules by which a person ac-
                                                                                                                                   
73  LJ(A) i.19-20, ii.27-28; LJ(B) 8, 9-10, 149, 174-175.  In the second 
course of lectures, the transformation is complete, and Smith no longer 
speaks of hereditas as the fourth real right at all, but as an example of 
exclusive privilege. 
74  LJ(A) i. 20, ii.28-29; LJ(B) 9-10, 174. 
75  LJ(A) ii.28-29; LJ(B) 174 (editors' emendation).  See also LJ(A) 
i.41-42, 43-44 (same point made in discussion of occupation). 
76 Haakonssen,  Science (supra, n. 6), p. 103. Ernest Metzger  20 
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quires ownership by occupation are considered separately and 
assigned a place chronologically. 
In the Age of Hunters: 
(1)  At first, ownership is not acquired until actual possession 
is acquired, and a mere expectation that something will come into 
one's possession is not enough to engage the sympathy of the spec-
tator77.  Under these conditions ownership is lost when possession 
is lost78. 
(2)  But in time, the sympathy of the spectator broadened, so 
that even when possession, once obtained, was temporarily lost, 
the (former) possessor was still regarded as having some sort of 
claim so long as he had some hope of recovering the thing79. 
In the Age of Shepherds: 
(3)  When people began to keep animals, a class of animals 
arose ('mansuefactae [naturae]') which return to their possessor 
even when let out of his power: these came to be regarded as 
owned by the possessor80.  At the very beginning of this time (with 
which the Age of Shepherds begins), all animals would be either 
mansuefactae or ferae.  When properly tamed (mansuetae) ani-
mals appear, they are treated as owned by their possessor in the 
same way as animals mansuefactae with a habit of returning81. 
(4)  'But in process of time, when some species of animalls 
came to be nowhere met but in the state of mansuefactae, they 
lost that name and became mansuetae.'82  This brings about a 
'great extention of the notion of property', because an animal 
which had been out of a person's power for a long time could be 
regarded as belonging to that person still, so long as that person 
could be distinguished in some way as its master83. 
Smith is here taking a specific historical right—the right to 
property by occupation in Roman law—and, by considering where 
spectator-sympathy would lie, attributing individual rules to dif-
ferent historical ages.  He does the same elsewhere; in the case of 
contract, for example, he says that the first periods of society did 
                                                                                                                                   
77  LJ(A) i.37-40; 42-43. 
78  LJ(A) i.41: 'At first property was conceived to end as well as to 
begin with possession.  They conceived that a thing was no longer ours in 
any way after we had lost the immediate property of it.'  LJ(B) 150: 
'Among savages property begins and ends with possession . . . .'  In the 
same passage, however, Smith notes that some 'lawyers' have regarded it 
as a breach of property to intervene in the chase of a wild beast that an-
other has started. 
79  LJ(A) i.41, 43-44. 
80 LJ(A)  i.44-46. 
81 LJ(A)  i.45-46. 
82 LJ(A)  i.46. 
83  LJ(A) i.46, iv.21; LJ(B) 151. Ernest Metzger  21 
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not perceive that an injury took place when a person broke his 
promise, and even when spectator-sympathy did first acknowl-
edge the injury, it acknowledged it only in the case of verborum 
obligationes, where the expectations of the parties were clear84.  
Delict likewise gives Smith an opportunity to attribute certain 
rights to certain ages85. 
Appreciating the nature of this exercise is important for un-
derstanding Smith's treatment of servitudes, to which I now re-
turn. 
5.  —  The sources of Smith's account of servitudes 
To recall: Smith argued that servitudes originally gave rise to 
personal rights.  I suggested above that Smith deliberately 
adopted this view and did not wander into it by mistake.  Here I 
set out what I believe are two of his sources.  The first, I believe, 
was his principal source. 
1.  Samuel von Cocceji, Introductio ad Grotium Illustratum (1748) 
Smith included Samuel von Cocceji (1679-1755) among a 
small number of writers whose jurisprudence he regarded as 'of 
note'86.  He says: 'There are five volumes in folio of his works pub-
lished, many of which are very ingenious and distinct, especially 
those which treat of laws.'87  Whether Smith intended the last 
clause as a kind of joke is not clear; I tend to read it as a dig at 
Cocceji's natural law.  It is also not clear whether Smith confused 
the son with the father (the son having both annotated the fa-
                                                                                                                                   
84  LJ(A) ii.46-49, 56-63; LJ(B) 176-177.  This is discussed in Stein, 
Adam Smith's Theory of Law and Society ( supra, n. 7), p. 267; idem, 
Adam Smith's Jurisprudence (supra, n. 28), p. 149; MacCormick, Adam 
Smith on Law (supra, n. 33), p. 204-205. 
85 See  Cairns,  Adam Smith's Lectures ( supra, n. 55), p. 70-71.   
Delict is historically a division of 'obligations', which means (historical) 
delictual rights fall under rights that belong to a man in his estate.  See 
LJ(A) ii.88; LJ(B) 181.  The Romans of course treated under delict many 
acts which we treat as crimes, and it is therefore no surprise that Smith 
treats crimes in this section.  Some of these historical rights are never-
theless 'natural'.  See, e.g., LJ(A) ii.93.  When Cairns says that Smith 
treated these natural rights as injuries to estate for 'ease of exposition', 
Cairns,  Adam Smith's Lectures ( supra, n. 55), p. 71, he is essentially 
right.  The specific reason, however, is that historical rights largely dic-
tate the organization of this part of Smith's lecture. 
86  LJ(B) 4.  He cites Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, and 'Baron de 
Cocceii'.  LJ(B) 1-4. 
87 LJ(B)  4. Ernest Metzger  22 
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ther's works on Grotius and added twelve dissertationes of his 
own)88.  In the earlier course of lectures Smith cites Cocceji only 
once89, though the editors have pointed out other places where 
Cocceji's influence might be present.  From the comment just 
quoted it seems certain at least that Smith admired Cocceji. 
  The passage which I believe was Smith's principal source for 
his treatment of servitudes is in the twelfth dissertatio in Cocceji's 
Introductio90.  The dissertatio is titled 'Systema de iustitia natu-
rali et romana', and the relevant section is titled 'Ubi probatur, 
servitutes natura non esse jus in re'.  The text and a translation 
are set out as an appendix to this essay.  Cocceji's argument, very 
briefly, is that both personal and predial servitudes, by natural 
law, gave rise only to personal rights and were therefore effective 
only between the agreeing parties, but that the civil law made 
these rights real.  His arguments are of two kinds, formal and 
practical.  His formal argument is that the agreements which the 
Roman jurists chose to treat as servitudes are only a selection of a 
broader class of similar agreements, and that many agreements in 
this broader class gave rise only to personal rights: this shows 
that the jurists selected the agreements we now call servitudes, 
                                                                                                                                   
88  The notes of the second course of Smith's lectures, from which 
the quoted statement is taken, do not always reproduce Smith's words 
verbatim: the notes have undergone some rewriting and often summarize 
matters which the earlier set of notes describes more fully.  See Meek, et 
al., edd., Lectures on Jurisprudence ( supra, n. 1), Introduction, p. 6-7.   
The works of father and son could easily have been conflated in the re-
writing.  
89  LJ(A) i.87, on prescription. 
90  Samuel L. B. von Cocceji, Introductio ad Henrici L. B. Cocceii . . . 
Grotium Illustratum, continens dissertationes prooemiales, Halle 1748, 
Diss. XII, 4.3.6 (§§ 302-305).  The twelfth dissertatio is a re-publication of 
a 1740 work, Elementa jurisprudentiae naturalis et romanae which, after 
its inclusion in the Introductio, appeared again as a single volume in 
1750 under the title Novum systema jurisprudentiae naturalis et ro-
manae.  See Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, 4, Leipzig 1876, p. 374 (a 
slightly different publication history—perhaps more accurate than that 
given in the ADB—is given by Haakonssen, Adam Smith Out of Context 
(supra, n. 58), p. 137 & n.31).  Which of these works Smith in fact relied 
on is not clear, though the Introductio was in Smith's library.  See Hiro-
shi Mizuta, Adam Smith's Library. A Catalogue, Oxford 2000, p. 59.  Coc-
ceji's argument in the Introductio expands on a remark he appended to 
his father's commentary on Grotius.  See Heinrich von Cocceji, Grotius 
Illustratus, seu commentarii ad Hugonis Grotii de jure belli et pacis libros 
tres, 1, Wratislava 1744, p. 79 (at Grotius 1.1.4): Jure naturae servitutes 
non pertinent ad jura realia, sed omne jus hic oritur ex pacto, unde tan-
tum oritur obligatio personalis. Ernest Metzger  23 
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and gave them special treatment91.  His practical argument is 
that, so long as servitudes gave rise only to personal actions, they 
were inconvenient to the owner of the servitude.  Two different 
points fall under this head.  (1) If the burdened property were 
sold, the benefits of the servitude came to an end.  (2) If a third 
person disturbed the owner of the servitude, that owner could sue 
only the owner of the servient estate, who in turn would have to 
sue the disturber, or cede the claim to the servitude owner92. 
  The general message of Smith's account is of course the same 
as that of Cocceji's account: all servitudes once gave rise only to 
personal rights but were subsequently made real.  What is largely 
missing in Smith's account is something we would not, in any 
event, expect to see; where Cocceji argues that servitudes were 'by 
nature' personal, Smith mostly argues that they were 'originally' 
personal93.  Aside from the general message, some of Cocceji's 
points have found their way into Smith's account. 
  (1) Smith may have adopted part of Cocceji's formal argu-
ment.  In the earlier set of notes Smith says that all burdens on 
property must have 'taken their rise' from a contract, and 'must 
originally have been personall . . . for a contract can produce noth-
ing but a personall right'94, and this closely resembles Cocceji's 
'servitus sua natura nihil aliud est, quam pactum . . . , ex omni 
autem pacto saltem oritur actio personalis'95.  (2) Smith's debt to 
Cocceji is clearer when we look at Cocceji's practical arguments.  
                                                                                                                                   
91  This is my own fuller account of what I take to be Cocceji's for-
mal argument.  See Cocceji, Introductio (supra, n. 90), § 303, and espe-
cially § 305 (Jurisconsulti Romani quatuor saltem casibus usum rei 
alienae inter jura in re retulerunt. . . .  Cum igitur saltem in quatuor illis 
casibus specialibus constitutum sit, ut actio realis detur, non in aliis, (ubi 
tamen eadem juris naturalis ratio est,) hae ipsae exceptiones probant, con-
stitutionem illam esse mere civilem.).  A second formal argument, put 
forward for real servitudes only, is that when certain restrictions on ser-
vitudes are ignored, a personal action remains.  Ibid., § 304 (Hanc autem 
. . . manet.). 
92 Cocceji,  Introductio (supra, n. 90), § 304 (Hac forma posita . . . 
cedere debet) (real servitudes), § 305 (Nam hoc quoque . . . possessori ser-
vitutis) (personal servitudes). 
93  Smith's historical jurisprudence is of course inconsistent with 
the idea of a 'state of nature', as he points out in LJ(B) 3.  Nevertheless, 
in one passage the notes record that servitudes 'are all naturaly personal 
rights'.  LJ(B) 172.  
94 LJ(A)  ii.19. 
95 Cocceji,  Introductio ( supra, n. 90), § 303.  There is, however, 
nothing in Smith like Cocceji's argument that predial servitudes are by 
nature personal because a personal action remains when the servitude 
breaches certain requirements. Ernest Metzger  24 
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Like Cocceji, Smith attributes the reform to 'legislators'96.  Smith's 
words, 'induced legislators to make them real, and claimable a 
quocumque possessore', closely recall Cocceji's words, 'actionem 
realem dedere Legislatores Romani praedio dominanti, ejusque 
possessori, ut servitutem a quocunque possessore vindicare pos-
sit'97.  The reasons for the reform are again similar in the two ac-
counts, but surprisingly it is the differences rather than the simi-
larities which prove the connection.  The two accounts are the 
same on the main point: the utility of a servitude is easily lost if it 
gives rise only to a personal right and the servitude owner cannot 
sue the offender directly.  The utility can be regained only by a 
succession of personal actions (Smith: 'multiplicity of actions'; 
Cocceji: 'ambages'98) or by the person who is bound to the servi-
tude owner ceding his right of action to that owner (Smith: 'oblige 
him to cede to him the obligation'; Cocceji: '[dominus praedii ser-
vientis actionem] cedere deberet'99).  But in the detail these two 
account are somewhat different.  As mentioned above, Cocceji de-
scribes two alternative circumstances in which the utility of a pre-
dial or personal servitude is lost.  In the first, the owner of the 
burdened property becomes an offender by alienating the prop-
erty; in the second, a third person is the offender and the servi-
tude owner is forced into a circuit of actions.  Unfortunately, it is 
not immediately clear from Cocceji's Latin that these are alterna-
tives: he joins the two with only sed and a reader is apt to read 
the second alternative as a continuation of the first100.  This in 
fact is what Smith has done: he has conflated the two examples 
and taken Cocceji to mean that the turbans of the second is the 
buyer of the first.  To give any sense to Smith's argument, how-
ever, the buyer-turbans must be bound by contract to observe the 
servitude, and thus Smith adds a new fact, that the owner of the 
servient estate 'take the purchaser bound to grant [the servitude 
owner] the liberty stipulated'101.  The result is a somewhat con-
                                                                                                                                   
96  LJ(B) 9; cf. Cocceji, Introductio (supra, n. 90), §§ 304, 305.  See 
also LJ(A) ii.37 ('by the determination of the legislature'). 
97  LJ(B) 9; Cocceji, Introductio (supra, n. 90), § 304.  By 'Legisla-
tores' Cocceji probably means the compilers of the Digest.  I am grateful 
for Professor Feenstra's guidance on this point.   
98  LJ(A) ii.16; Cocceji, Introductio (supra, n. 90), § 305.  
99  LJ(A) ii.16; Cocceji, Introductio (supra, n. 90), § 304.  The phrase 
actionem cedere debere is found in the Digest (see D.43.18.1.1 (Ulpian 70 
ed.)), so Smith did not necessarily get it from Cocceji.  
100  In his account of both predial and personal servitudes, Cocceji 
introduces the second alternative with sed et si; he possibly had in mind a 
German word with a more disjunctive force (außerdem? dennoch?) not 
carried by sed. 
101 LJ(A)  ii.15. Ernest Metzger  25 
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trived example, where successive sellers and buyers carefully ob-
serve the servitude in their contract terms, but a single buyer 
nevertheless impedes the servitude.  The case for law reform is 
perhaps not so pressing here.  In any event, the nature of the dis-
crepancy between Smith's single example and Cocceji's two-fold 
example demonstrates Smith's debt to Cocceji in an interesting 
way.  The nature of the discrepancy, moreover, shows that the two 
writers are not themselves indebted to some third source. 
  Smith's reliance on Cocceji also explains how Smith came to 
miscite the Servian and quasi-Servian actions in LJ(A) ii.16.  In 
the section immediately following the section on servitudes, Coc-
ceji speaks very briefly about pledge ('Ubi demonstratur, per pig-
nus naturali ratione non constitui jus aliquod in re')102.  Smith's 
account of pledge is again very similar to Cocceji's103.  It is in this 
section that Cocceji mentions how first the Servian and then the 
quasi-Servian made the rights of the creditor real104.  It is reason-
able to infer that Smith, having consulted Cocceji's accounts of 
both servitudes and pledge, misattributed part of the second ac-
count to the first. 
2.  Lord Kames, Historical Law-Tracts (1758) 
Lord Kames (1696-1782) was sponsor, adviser, and friend to 
Smith for much of Smith's professional life105, and parts of his 
Historical Law-Tracts share the spirit of Smith's historical juris-
prudence106.  The third tract is titled 'History of Property'.  In the 
relevant passage107 Kames is discussing the relation of property 
and possession, and in particular the proposition that property 
was not always acquired with possession.  This leads to a discus-
sion of theft, and remedies for pursuing the person into whose 
hands stolen goods have fallen.  In a lengthy footnote to this dis-
cussion108, he discusses the development of certain relevant Ro-
man institutions, in particular the condictio furtiva, restitutio in 
                                                                                                                                   
102 Cocceji,  Introductio (supra, n. 90), Diss. XII, 4.3.7 (§§ 306-308).   
103  Cf. Ibid., § 306, with LJ(A) ii.19-20.  Both authors repeat the 'cir-
cuit of actions' argument. 
104 Cocceji,  Introductio (supra, n. 90), §§ 307, 308. 
105  I. S. Ross, Lord Kames and the Scotland of his Day, Oxford 1972, 
p. 91-95; W. C. Lehmann, Henry Home, Lord Kames, and the Scottish 
Enlightenment, The Hague 1971, p. 61. 
106  Kames' attitude to the growth of law and its foundation in mor-
als is discussed in Ross, Lord Kames (supra, n. 105), p. 202-21.  Historical 
Law-Tracts was in Smith's library.  Mizuta, Adam Smith's Library (su-
pra, n. 90), p. 137. 
107 Kames,  Historical Law-Tracts (supra, n. 4), p. 83-88. 
108  Ibid., p. 85-88 note. Ernest Metzger  26 
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integrum, and the actio metus.  The last of these was available 
against a good-faith possessor, and so, in Kames' opinion, was 
hardly different from rei vindicatio.  He then writes:109 
Hence it is, that, in the Roman Law, the actio metus is classed 
under a species denominated, Actiones in rem scriptae, a spe-
cies which has puzzled all the commentators, and which none 
of them have been able to explain. . . .  All actions pass under 
that name, which, originally personal, were,  by the aug-
mented vigour of the relation of property, made afterwards 
real. 
  We also discover from the Roman law, that other real 
rights made a progress similar to that mentioned concerning 
property.  There was, for example, in the Roman law no real 
action originally for recovering a pledge, when the creditor, by 
accident or otherwise, had lost the possession.  It was the Pre-
tor Servius who gave a real action. 
There are no real similarities of language between Kames and 
Smith; what recommends this as a source is the fact that, like 
Cocceji, Kames discusses the general progress of personal rights 
into real rights, and that he joins to the discussion a reference to 
the Servian action.  This passage, along with Cocceji's account of 
pledge, may also have prompted Smith to misremember the 
proper context of the Servian and quasi-Servian actions.  
6.  —  The problem 
Why did Smith adopt Cocceji's argument?  He does not tell us, 
and it is possible of course that he was simply persuaded by what 
Cocceji had written.  But that Smith needed the argument is eas-
ily shown.  The problem, very briefly, is that it would have been 
difficult for Smith to include servitudes in his historical jurispru-
dence if he had relied uncritically on their treatment in the Ro-
man sources.  Roman law of course treats predial servitudes and 
certain personal servitudes as rights in the immoveable property 
of another110.  To Smith, the existence of immoveable property 
presumes that a civilization is moderately advanced: immoveable 
property is not recognized until the Age of Agriculture.  The diffi-
culty arises from the fact that servitudes are needed before prop-
erty in immoveables is recognized.  There are two areas of conflict, 
                                                                                                                                   
109  Ibid., 87-88 note.  On metus and 'actio in rem scripta', see 
D.4.2.9.8 (Ulpian 11 ed.). 
110  See, e.g., J. Inst. 2.3.3, 2.4.2; D.8.1.3 (Paul 21 ed.); D.8.2.2 (Gaius 
7 ed. prov.); D.7.1.3 pr. (Gaius 2 rerum cott.). Ernest Metzger  27 
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or more accurately, two areas where Smith may have tried to 
mend a conflict.  The first is not serious and I mention it only as a 
possibility. 
  According to Smith, property in land was introduced in the 
Age of Agriculture by a gradual process111.  First, the community 
as a whole gave to individuals particular rights over the surface: 
the right to plough, sow, reap the fruits, and pasture.  In time, the 
possessors of these rights came to be regarded as the owners of 
the surface.  Finally, by accession the remainder of the land—the 
trees, stones, minerals—became the property of the owner of the 
surface.  This evolutionary account is interesting and even credi-
ble, but it is nevertheless impossible to reconcile with the Roman 
sources.  The order of events (limited surface rights, then a gen-
eral proprietary right in the land) is essentially an argument that 
servitudes preceded land ownership, and is therefore at odds with 
the usual account of, e.g., the right to take the fruits of the land, 
or the right to pasture, which presume the prior existence of land 
ownership.  This poses a problem for Smith: because some of these 
limited surface rights are what we regard as servitudes, Smith 
perhaps did not wish to leave unchallenged the suggestion that 
servitudes were always rights in the immoveable property of an-
other.  Cocceji's account of the origin of servitudes would solve the 
problem, because personal rights avoid any implication of prop-
erty in land. 
  This is the lesser of Smith's problems, however: predial servi-
tudes alone will have caused him genuine trouble.  This is be-
cause, if we follow Smith's account, something like predial servi-
tudes were needed before the Age of Agriculture had even begun.  
In the Age of Shepherds, animals are the principal item of wealth.  
Animals also happen to be one of the principal subjects of the law 
of predial servitudes: neighbours typically have to make accom-
modations with one another about the drawing of water and the 
driving and pasturing of animals.  We might therefore presume 
that, from time to time, neighbours in the Age of Shepherds would 
require something like a servitude so that one neighbour could, 
e.g., drive his animals over his neighbour's land.  But there is a 
problem: if ownership of land was not recognized in the Age of 
Shepherds, then there is no such thing as 'neighbour's land', no 
basis for ownership rights to be relaxed, and thus no opportunity 
                                                                                                                                   
111  For this account, see LJ(A) i.66; LJ(B) 152.  The account of the 
development of property in land in the Anderson Notes is quite different: 
see Meek, ed., Anderson Notes (supra, n. 1), p. 467 (labour expended on 
the area about the house causes neglect of public fields). Ernest Metzger  28 
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for these accommodations ever to arise112.  In other words, these 
accommodations were badly needed, and yet unavailable. 
Smith, I suggest, recognized the problem, but recognized also 
that to put the problem this way relied overmuch on the devel-
oped law.  Disputes about pasturing, driving, and watering ani-
mals, and the accommodations needed to resolve these disputes, 
would arise wherever land is possessed: ownership is not essen-
tial.  In the first course of lectures, we notice, he gives examples of 
servitudes between neighbouring possessors rather than owners, 
and in fact speaks more frequently of possessors than owners, 
e.g.113: 
. . . the possessor of [one] farm should have the liberty of a 
road thro the farm of his neighbour.  This he may obtain for a 
certain gratuity from the possessor; and take his obligation to 
grant him that liberty in time to come.  This would be given 
him not as being such a man but as being possessor of such a 
farm . . . . 
It is clear, moreover, that inhabitants of the Age of Shepherds, 
though not owners of land, do possess pieces of land for them-
selves and their animals114: 
The life of a shepherd requires that he should frequently 
change his situation, or at least the place of his pasturing, to 
find pasture for his cattle.  The property of the spot he built on 
would be conceived to end as soon as he had left it, in the same 
                                                                                                                                   
112 Haakonssen,  Natural Jurisprudence (supra, n. 62), p. 177:  '. . . 
there can hardly be disputes over property in land as long as a society 
has not got the idea that land is the sort of thing which can be owned; 
and consequently even the most exemplary application of the principles 
of the impartial spectator will not by itself extend the law of property to 
land.' 
113  LJ(A) ii.14-15.  In the second set of lectures this is not so clear.  
The language is often ambiguous as to whether the neighbours own or 
only possess the land, but the illustrations are not reproduced very fully. 
114  LJ(A) i.48-49.  The version in LJ(B) 150-151 is much abbrevi-
ated.  See also Dalrymple, General History (supra, n. 4), p. 76: 
During this period [sc. pasturage], as soon as a flock have brouzed 
upon one spot of ground, their proprietors will remove them to an-
other; and the place they have quitted will fall to the next who 
pleases to take possession of it: For this reason such shepherds will 
have no notion of property in immoveables, nor of right of possession 
longer than the act of possession last. Ernest Metzger  29 
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manner as the seats in a theatre or a hut on the shore belong 
no longer to any person than they are possessed by him.  They 
would not easily conceive a subject of such extent as land is, 
should belong to an object so little as a single man.  It would 
more easily be conceived that a large body such as a whole na-
tion should have property in land.  Accordingly we find that in 
many nations the different tribes have each their peculiar 
territory on which the others dare not encroach (as the 
Tartars and inhabitants of the coast of Guinea).  But here the 
property is conceived to continue no longer in a private person 
than he actually possessed the subject.  A field that had been 
pastured on by one man would be considered to be his no 
longer than he actually staid on it. 
In short, the possession of neighbouring lands, in the ordinary 
course of things, would have required neighbours to make agree-
ments with each other, particularly agreements in the nature of 
actus, aquae haustus, and ius pascendi115.  Agreements of various 
kinds existed in the Age of Shepherds, as already discussed116.  
The obstacle was in the Roman sources: if Smith relied on them 
uncritically, he would have to accept that the inhabitants of the 
Age of Shepherds were incapable of making these kinds of agree-
ments, because immoveable property was not yet recognized.   
Therefore to avoid the objection that servitudes could not have 
existed in this age, presuming as they do the existence of im-
moveable property, he put forward the explanation that servi-
tudes originally gave rise only to personal rights. 
7.  —  Progress of Smith's views 
The progress of Smith's views on servitudes can be described 
to some extent, though only tentatively.  In the earlier course of 
lectures, Smith summarizes how he intends to discuss servitudes 
in a later lecture.  But the account he gives here is not the same 
as the account he eventually gave; it is instead an entirely con-
ventional one117: 
Property is to be considered as an exclusive right by which we 
can hinder any other person from using in any shape what we 
possess in this manner.  A man for instance who possesses a 
farm of land can hinder any other not only from intermedling 
with any of the products but from walking across his field.  
                                                                                                                                   
115 J.  Inst. 2.3 pr., 2. 
116  Above, notes 49 to 50 and accompanying text. 
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'Tis from the relaxation or yielding up some part of this exclu-
sive right in favours of a particular person that the right of 
servitudes has arose. 
The 2d species of real rights therefore is servitudes.   
These are precisely the giving up some part of the full right of 
property.  As if a mans farm lies betwixt me and the publick 
road or any market town, I may by agreement or by law (as 
we shall hereafterwards observe) obtain a servitude (that is, 
relaxation of his exclusive right) by which I am allowed to 
travel on horse or foot or drive carriages thro' his farm. 
In the later course of lectures, the passage corresponding to this 
one118 summarizes Smith's view that servitudes originally gave 
rise to personal rights.  The passage quoted here, on the other 
hand, repeats the standard view that all servitudes are a relaxa-
tion of a right of property119—a view omitted from the later ac-
counts120.  It is possible that at the time he gave this conventional 
account (27 December 1762121) he did not yet appreciate the prob-
lem in chronology that 'real rights in the immoveable property of 
another' would cause.  If this is right, the problem came to his at-
tention at some time between that day and 18 January 1763, 
when he gave the new account, having taken guidance from Coc-
ceji122.  
  Cocceji's guidance may have created problems of its own, how-
ever.  There is virtually no discussion of personal servitudes in 
Roman law in either course of lectures, so far as I am aware123.  It 
                                                                                                                                   
118  Quoted above accompanying note 14. 
119  More or less like the account given by Hutcheson, System, 1 (su-
pra, n. 27), p. 351. 
120  Cf. LJ(A) ii.38 (servititude 'always implies that there is a jus in 
re aliena constitutum').  Since this contradicts the 'originally personal' 
thesis, I take Smith to be referring to the modern law, which the context 
supports. 
121  In giving this date I am following the suggestion of the editors.  
See Meek, et al., edd., Lectures on Jurisprudence (supra, n. 1), Introduc-
tion, p. 18. 
122  Similarly, Smith's account of pledge in LJ(A) i.18-19, accompany-
ing his conventional account of servitudes, is itself conventional: this 
supports the idea that he did not consult Cocceji until after this lecture. 
123  There is one sentence in LJ(A) ii.16 which alludes to Roman per-
sonal servitudes:  
Most of these [predial servitudes EM] besides many others are in use 
amongst us. {The life rent or 2dly the use of a house or other subject, 
as the opera servorum, may also be considered as servitudes as soon Ernest Metzger  31 
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is particularly surprising to find no discussion of Roman usu-
fruct124.  Personal and predial servitudes are different in many 
respects, but from Justinian onwards the usual textbook treat-
ment keeps them together125, and this is certainly what 
Hutcheson (whom Smith follows so closely126) does127.  Does the 
omission of Roman personal servitudes say anything about the 
progress of Smith's views? 
    There are two innocent explanations for the omission: (1) 
Smith had nothing to say about personal servitudes because they 
had no special qualities which any historical age could be said to 
'determine'; or (2) personal servitudes presented no special prob-
lems as predial servitudes did, and thus there was no urgent rea-
son to discuss them.  The less innocent explanation—which I sug-
gest is the correct one—is that Smith, though agreeing with 
Cocceji that all servitudes originally gave rise to personal 
                                                                                                                                   
as it is lawfull, as it certainly may be, to sell a superiority with such 
a burthen} 
The corresponding passage in LJ(B) 172 says more briefly 'Life rents on 
estates and many other things are also servitudes, and are properly per-
sonal.'  A 'life rent' is the Scots equivalent of usus fructus; 'use of a house 
or other subject' must be a reference to habitatio and usus; and opera 
servorum is what is usually more fully given as opera servorum vel ani-
malium.  All of these are Roman personal servitudes, but confusingly 
Smith is not discussing Roman law.  He has begun a discussion of feudal 
law, and is speaking of the sale of the rights of a feudal superior, where 
the property is burdened by a life rent.  The '2dly' muddies things by in-
troducing three Roman rights.  To make matters more confusing, the 
bracketed sentence does not appear on the page with the main body of 
the text, but on the reverse.  This means that its position in the text is 
not absolutely certain (though by reference to the corresponding passage 
in LJ(B) the sentence belongs either where it is printed or after the sen-
tence immediately following).  My best judgment is that Smith has added 
Roman servitudes to the discussion to show hypothetically how they 
would be treated in feudal law.  He is nevertheless silent on how they 
arose in Roman law, which is my point above. 
124  There is the briefest mention in LJ(A) iii.85, and discussions of 
life rent in Scots law in places, but no proper discussion of the Roman 
institution anywhere, so far as I am aware. 
125 See  Pufendorf,  De officio hominis et civis 1.12.8; Heineccius, 
Elementa iuris civilis secundum ordinem Institutionum (supra, n. 27), § 
392; Arnold Vinnius, Institutionum imperialium commentarius aca-
demicus et forensis, J. G. Heineccius recensuit, Leiden 1726, ad Inst. 2.3. 
126  See Meek, ed., Anderson Notes (supra, n. 1), p. 461-66. 
127 Hutcheson,  System, 1 (supra, n. 27), p. 351; idem, Short Intro-
duction (supra, n. 27), p. 169-70. Ernest Metzger  32 
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rights128, was unable to make the case for personal servitudes.   
Cocceji gives the same argument for both kinds of servitude: they 
were easy to frustrate, and awkward to enforce, until they were 
made real129.  The argument is adequate for most personal servi-
tudes—habitatio, usus, opera servorum—but for usus fructus, the 
most common one, the argument does not work at all.  This is be-
cause usus fructus is not simply a right to possess and use, which 
could conceivably be the object of a simple bilateral relation, but a 
right to take and become owner of fruits which would otherwise be 
another's property130.  Cocceji's argument misses the fact that if a 
usufruct had ever created personal rights and personal rights 
only, it would provide no fruits to the usufructuary and would be 
no usufruct at all131.  This suggests the possibility that Smith, 
though happy to adopt Cocceji's theory as it related to predial ser-
vitudes, preferred to stay silent on the origins of personal servi-
tudes. 
8.  —  The wider problem, of which servitudes is an example 
I have been discussing a problem with servitudes alone, and it 
would be wrong to exaggerate the problem or to suggest that 
Smith was overly bothered by it.  The nature of the problem is 
nevertheless revealing, because it shows that Smith's historical 
jurisprudence brought him face-to-face with certain opponents 
that his natural-law predecessors had less trouble with: the Ro-
man lawyers.  Carmichael, for example, was unhappy with 
Pufendorf's belief that agreements between men to limit their 
                                                                                                                                   
128 LJ(A)  ii.14. 
129 See  Appendix. 
130  See, e.g., D.7.1.7 pr.-2 (Ulpian 17 Sab.). 
131  My main point is that Cocceji does not give a cogent argument 
for the 'personal' origin of usufruct (and that Smith saw through it), but I 
should not leave the impression that 'usufruct created a right of owner-
ship' because the institution is more subtle than that.  The usufructuary 
only became owner of the fruits by taking them; what qualified as a fruit 
was circumscribed; and whether a usufruct was an incident of ownership 
or an independent right was, and is, disputed.  See Kaser, Das römische 
Privatrecht (supra, n. 18), p. 447-51; W. W. Buckland, A Text-Book of Ro-
man Law, 3rd ed. rev P. Stein, Cambridge 1963, p. 269-71.  An unusual 
description of usufruct, from some years ago, says that usufruct was not 
even itself a servitude, but that 'usufruct had a servitude', namely the 
physical possession of the corpus, by means of which the usufruct was 
exercised.  K. Kagan, The Nature of Servitudes and the Association of 
Usufruct with them, Tulane Law Review, 22 (1947), p. 94-110.  The de-
scription is a reasonable attempt to show that usufruct is not ownership, 
but necessarily carries ownership within itself. Ernest Metzger  33 
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ownership took place in society, but not in a state of nature.   
Carmichael suggested that such 'agreements or dispositions' could 
indeed take place in a state of nature, and he mentions servitudes 
as an example of this132.  Carmichael's argument is a simple one; 
to make the point that a bare 'servitude-like agreement' could ex-
ist in a state of nature, he did not have to do battle with the juris-
tic literature; all the lawyerly refinements in the law of servitudes 
could, so to speak, be left among the great mass of adventitious 
rules and ignored.  Similarly, Heineccius has only to make the 
point that servitudes were naturally created by an act of will, and 
to dismiss all the rules as the 'subtle creations of jurists'133.  
Smith's natural jurisprudence, on the other hand, was more ambi-
tious and in many respects harder to prove.  Whenever Smith 
sought to give a historical account of a Roman rule or institution, 
he ran the risk of coming up against a contrary historical account 
in the Roman sources.  Contrary accounts are not intrinsically 
fatal to Smith's enterprise; the right history is not necessarily the 
one a jurist gives or the legal forms imply.  But it may take argu-
ment and effort to show why the sources have it wrong.  Some 
contrary accounts Smith chose to ignore, as for example he chose 
to ignore the fact that some 'lawyers' regarded intervening in an-
other's chase as a breach of property (though according to Smith 
property did not exist in the earliest age)134.  But the anomaly of a 
right in immoveable property existing in an age before immove-
able property was recognized was serious and could not be ig-
nored. 
  I mentioned above that Smith uses his historical jurispru-
dence for two purposes: (1) to speculate about the development of 
historical rights whose history is otherwise unknown, and (2) to 
show how some historical rights deviated from the model135.  The 
first of these is difficult to accomplish when the subject is Roman 
law.  The thesis that certain rights tend to arise under certain con-
ditions is not an easy thesis to maintain in the face of a highly de-
veloped legal literature, and that is the lesson of Smith's treatment 
of Roman servitudes.  Smith's single most successful effort to 
bring Roman law into his historical jurisprudence is his treatment 
                                                                                                                                   
132 Carmichael,  Supplementa (supra, n. 27), p. 133-34. 
133  Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, Elementa juris naturae et gentium, 
Venice 1802, p. 221 (§ 282). The passage refers to § 279, where the author 
discusses the view that what passes by traditio is only what the person 
wills.  Ibid., p. 219. 
134  Above, note 78.  The 'lawyers' are also ignored in LJ(A) i.65, 75-
76 (accession); i.73-75 (specification). 
135  Above, note 63 and accompanying text. Ernest Metzger  34 
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of the Roman rules of occupation, described in detail above136.  
Was it his only real success?  The editors of the Lectures have 
noted that Smith altered the second course of lectures in a way 
that downplays the four ages as a framework for private law.   
Where in the earlier lectures the discussion of the four ages intro-
duces acquisition of property generally, in the latter the discus-
sion has been altered so as to introduce occupation only137.  
Though mode of subsistence is still used in the latter course of 
lectures to explain other rules of private law, the change of em-
phasis is clear. 
In closing I note that Smith's remarks on the original nature 
of servitudes are not entirely contrary to current opinion.  Wat-
son, for example, accepts the common view that originally servi-
tudes in some way involved ownership over the object of the servi-
tude, but expresses doubts about one argument which supports 
the view:138 the argument that, because early law recognized own-
ership as the only real right, and because in early law the four 
original servitudes could only be transferred by mancipatio, those 
servitudes necessarily vested ownership in part of the land139.  He 
begins with a 'mode of subsistence' observation: 'As a social and 
economic fact those things which came to be legally recognized as 
the four original servitudes are of extreme importance in a primi-
tive agricultural society.'140  He then argues that mancipatio was 
probably the only available method for transferring a servitude, 
whatever its character.  He concludes141: 
Given the social importance of the four original servitude 
situations, the resulting need for a legal method of creating 
servitudes, the fact that no other possible direct method of 
creating servitudes existed, and that individuals must have 
tried to create servitudes by mancipatio, I think it could easily 
happen that 'servitudes' created by mancipatio would be given 
legal recognition even without there being the slightest feeling 
that the servitude was a corporeal thing or that what was be-
ing transferred was ownership of the land over which the way 
or aqueduct passed. 
                                                                                                                                   
136  Above, notes 78 to 83 and accompanying text. 
137  Meek, et al., edd., Lectures on Jurisprudence (supra, n. 1), Intro-
duction, p. 30. 
138 Watson,  The Law of Property (supra, n. 20), p. 92-94. 
139 Kaser,  Privatrecht (supra, n. 18), p. 143. 
140 Watson,  The Law of Property (supra, n. 20), p. 92-93. 
141  Ibid., p. 94. Ernest Metzger  35 
 
PREPRINT 
Diósdi is another sceptic of the prevailing view, and some of his 
views recall Smith's, though he avoids the anachronism of Smith's 
real/personal distinction142: 
It is indeed questionable whether the idea of walking or going 
o[n] the strip of land designed for it was the primary meaning 
of via.  In other words in this case, I think that the act is a 
more concrete idea than the thing necessary for realizing it. 
 He goes on to challenge the view that ancient servitudes were 
corporeal143, arguing as Watson does that they were treated as res 
mancipi only so that mancipatio could be used to transfer them.   
He concludes that they came into existence as 'independent 
rights', perhaps lacking a definite form of legal protection144. 
  Both writers are making a different point than Smith, that 
originally predial servitudes were not necessarily corporeal rights.  
But the exercise is broadly the same: both writers show that one 
can give a sociological account of the development of servitudes 
that goes contrary to the legal sources; that what the jurists said 
or what the legal forms imply is not the final word; in short, that 
Smith's battle was winnable. 
9.  —  Appendix: Cocceji on servitudes 
Samuel L.B. von Cocceji, Introductio ad Henrici L. B. Cocceii . 
. . Grotium Illustratum, continens dissertationes prooemiales, 
Halle 1748, Diss. XII ('Systema de iustitia naturali et romana'),  
4.3.6 (§§ 302-305). 
The text below is a short discussion of the nature of servitudes 
by Samuel von Cocceji.  He makes a similar but more brief obser-
vation in Heinrich von Cocceji, Grotius Illustratus, seu commen-
tarii ad Hugonis Grotii de jure belli et pacis libros tres, 1, Breslau 
1744, p. 79 (at Grotius 1.1.4).   Grotius is here speaking of ius as a 
right which has reference to a person; in this sense a right is a 
moral quality belonging to a person to have or to do something 
lawfully.  These rights belong to persons, notwithstanding the fact 
that a right may, as in the case of a predial servitude, relate to a 
piece of property.  To Grotius' comment ut servitutes praediorum, 
quae jura realia dicuntur, Heinrich von Cocceji comments that 
these rights, though real, do give rights to persons.  Samuel von 
Cocceji takes issue with this: Jure naturae servitutes non pertinent 
ad jura realia, sed omne jus hic oritur ex pacto, unde tantum 
                                                                                                                                   
142 Diósdi,  Ownership (supra, n. 18), p. 114. 
143  Ibid., p. 113-16. 
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oritur obligatio personalis.  He then refers the reader to the text 
set out below.  His footnotes are included below but modernized. 
a)  Text 
UBI PROBATUR, SERVITUTES NATURA NON ESSE JUS 
IN RE 
§ CCCII.  Jurisconsulti Romani praeter dominium, et, quae 
dominii species est, haereditatem, adhuc duas alias species juris 
in re constituerunt, nimirum servitutem et pignus.  Nos demon-
strabimus, haec iura in re ex mera ratione juris civilis originem 
traxisse: Primo autem de servitute agemus.  
§ CCCIII.  SERVITUS sua natura nihil aliud est, quam pactum de 
usu rei suae in alium transferendo, ex omni autem pacto saltem 
oritur actio personalis.  Neque enim usus alii permittitur alia in-
tentione, quam ut utatur vi pacti; unde non magis jus in re oritur, 
quam ex pacto commodati, et locati, quo utilitas rei meae vel 
gratis, vel pro mercede in alium transfertur. 
§ CCCIV.  Ratio autem, cur Jurisconsulti Romani ei, qui servi-
tutem talem quaesivit, ius in ipsa re competere voluerint, in ap-
rico est.  Nam 
I.)  In servitutibus praedialibus Jurisconsulti Romani sup-
ponunt (a) duo praedia145, <(b)> eaque vicina146: (c) ut servitus 
utilitatem habeat147; et quidem (d) perpetuam148. 
  Hac forma posita, Jurisconsulti Romani crediderunt actionem 
personalem non sufficere ad utilitatis illius perpetuae effectum 
consequendum: Nam (1) dominus praedii servientis, alienando 
praedium, intervertere servitutem quae praedio meo perpetuam 
utilitatem procurare debet, posset: Sed et (2) si tertius me in ser-
vitute turbaret, vel usum rei prohiberet, actio non contra tur-
bantem, sed contra dominum praedii, intendanda esset, et hic 
demum actionem contra turbantem intentare, vel eam cedere de-
beret149. 
  Ne igitur per indirectum quis privetur utilitate praedio suo 
utili, eique perpetuo destinata, actionem realem dedere Legisla-
                                                                                                                                   
145  J.2.3 pr.; D.8.2.23.1 (Pomp. 23 Sab.). 
146  D.8.3.5.1 (Ulp. 17 ed.). 
147  D.8.1.15 pr. (Pomp. 33 Sab.); D.8.3.5 (Ulp. 17 ed.); D.8.1.8 (Paul 
15 Plaut.). 
148  D.8.2.28 (Paul 15 Sab.). 
149  Vide D.7.1.12.5 (Ulp. 17 Sab.); D.47.2.62(61).8 (Afric. 8 quaest.); 
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tores Romani praedio dominanti, ejusque possessori, ut servi-
tutem a quocunque possessore vindicare possit: Atque hinc quasi 
traditionem quoque requirunt (quia ius in re non nisi traditione 
constituitur,) pro traditione autem ipsis est usus actualis, vel pa-
tientia domini150. 
  Hanc autem constitutionem esse mere civilem, patet (1) ex 
forma lege praescripta, qua cessante actio personalis manet.  Nam 
(2) servitus, quae in praediis non vicinis constituitur, actionem 
producit mere personalem151:  Aeque ac (3) servitutes, quae prae-
dio meo utiles non sunt, uti si paciscor cum vicino domino, ne per 
fundum suum eat, aut ibi consistat152; ne suo fundo fruatur; ne in 
suo fundo aquam quaerat; ne viridaria tollat; ut locum suum 
amoeniorem reddat mei prospectus causa, etc153. Huc quoque per-
tinet pactum, ut spatiari, coenare, pomum decerpere in vicino 
liceat154.  Sed et (4) mera actio personalis mihi datur, si servitus 
non habet causam perpetuam155.  Si vero (5) servitus, seu jus per-
cipiendi utilitatem in praedio alieno, sua natura jus aliquod in re 
ipsa nobis concederet, id quoque verum esset in praediis non 
viciniis, et licet praedium inde perpetuam utilitatem non haberet. 
§ CCCV.  II.)  In servitutibus personalibus ratio juris civilis itidem 
clara est.  Nam (1) Jurisconsulti Romani quatuor saltem casibus 
usum rei alienae inter jura in re retulerunt (a) in usufructu, si 
usufructus, i.e. jus utendi fruendi re aliena, salva substantia, 
alicui pacto conceditur: vel quoties res, quae usu consumuntur, ea 
lege utendae conceduntur, ut vel res in genere, vel earum aesti-
matio restituatur, quod negotium quasi usufructus vocatur, ubi 
cautio loco proprietatis est, quae ex natura rei salva esse nequit.  
(b)  In usu, si jus utendi fruendi re aliena salva substantia, ad 
quotidianas necessitates alicui permittitur.  (c)  In habitatione, si 
non totus aedium usufructus, sed saltem pars ea, quae in habi-
tando consistit, conceditur.  (d)  In opera servorum, si itidem non 
totius servi usufructus sed ea pars, quae in operis consistit, alicui 
conceditur. 
  In omnibus reliquis casibus actio manet personalis, uti si per 
commodatum res alii utenda gratis conceditur, item si per loca-
tionem usus rei pro mercede in alium transfertur; porro, si per 
pactum jus decerpendi pomum in vicino horto permittitur156.  Etc. 
                                                                                                                                   
150  D.8.1.20 (Jav. 5 post. Lab.). 
151  D.34.1.18 [sc. D.34.1.14.3 (Ulp. 2 fid.)]. 
152  D.8.1.15 (Pomp. 33 Sab.). 
153  D.8.1.15.1 (Pomp. 33 Sab.). 
154  D.8.1.8 pr. (Paul 15 Plaut.). 
155  D.8.2.28 (Paul 15 Sab.); Gothofredus ad h. l. 
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  Cum igitur (2) saltem in quatuor illis casibus specialibus con-
stitutum sit, ut actio realis detur, non in aliis, (ubi tamen eadem 
juris naturalis ratio est,) hae ipsae exceptiones probant, constitu-
tionem illam esse mere civilem.  Ratio autem, cur (3) Jurisconsulti 
Romani hos quatuor casus inter jura in re retulerunt, eadem vide-
tur fuisse, quae in servitutibus realibus: Nam hoc quoque pacto 
utilitas quaedam perpetua in utentem transfertur, (sua enim 
natura non nisi morte finitur) quam dominus rei fructuario per 
indirectum auferre posset, rem alienando: (nam emtor non tene-
tur stare pacto antecessoris) quo casu fructuario nil nisi actio per-
sonalis superesset, ad id quod interest.  Sed et si tertius aliquis 
hunc fructuarium impediret, hic contra solum dominum rei, 
dominus autem demum contra turbantem agere deberet157.  Has 
ambages tollunt legislatores Romani, dando actionem realem pos-
sessori servitutis. 
  Sane (4) ob has utilitatis rationes Jurisconsulti Romani etiam 
in aliis causis, quae sua natura obligationem personalem produ-
cunt, jus aliquod in re constituerunt.  Haec enim ratio est, cur 
conductori vel emtori superficiei, si aedificat, plantat, vel alio 
modo aliquid imponit, actio realis detur: Si quis enim in superfi-
ciei usu turbatur, actione personali ex conducto vel emto cum dom-
ino agere, et dominus cedere suas actiones superficiario teneba-
tur158, sed longe utilius visum est (quia melius est possidere, quam 
in personam experiri) quasi in rem actionem polliceri, atque ideo 
Praetor actionem realem inde dedit159.  Jure naturali igitur con-
ductor vel emtor jus reale in superficiem non habet, (superficies 
enim naturali jure cedit solo160) sed Praetor ex singulari illa ra-
tione dat actionem realem. 
  Sed et porro, Emphyteusin, quae nihil aliud est quam locatio 
perpetua, inter jura in re retulerunt161, ac dominii speciem de-
clararunt; ne in arbitrio domini sit usum illum perpetuum 
alienando intervertere, et ne fructuarius per ambages usum illum 
sibi afferere opus habeat. 
  Pari ergo ratione pro servitutibus vindicandis actiones reales, 
nimirum actiones confessoriae et negatoriae, datae fuit. 
                                                                                                                                   
157  Vide D.7.1.12.5 (Ulp. 17 Sab.); D.19.2.60.5 (Lab. 5 post. Iav. 
epit.). 
158  D.43.18.1.1 (Ulp. 70 ed.). 
159  D.43.18.1 (Ulp. 70 ed.). 
160  D.43.18 i.f. (Gaius 25 ed. prov.). 
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b)  Translation 
WHERE I SHOW THAT BY NATURE SERVITUDES ARE 
NOT REAL RIGHTS 
§ 302.  The Roman jurists established two further kinds of ius in 
re other than dominium and hereditas (itself a kind of dominium): 
they are of course servitus and pignus.  I will show that these iura 
in re derive entirely from the reasoning of the civil law.  I must 
address servitudes first. 
§ 303.  By nature a SERVITUDE is simply an agreement whereby 
the use of one's own property is transferred to another, every 
agreement giving only a personal action.  And the other person is 
allowed the use only on the understanding that he use the prop-
erty according to the agreement.  A real right does not arise here 
any more than in an agreement to loan or to let, where the benefit 
of my property (whether for free or for a charge) is passed to an-
other. 
§ 304.  And the reason why the Roman jurists would want a per-
son who sought such a servitude to have a right in the thing itself 
is clear.  Namely: 
I.)  In the case of praedial servitudes the Roman jurists imag-
ined (a) two estates; (b) close to one another; (c) that the servitude 
would convey a benefit; and (d) that this benefit would be perpet-
ual. 
  With this outline in mind the Roman jurists believed that a 
personal action would not adequately ensure that the benefit 
would be perpetual: for (1) the owner of the burdened estate, by 
conveying the estate to another, would be able to subvert the ser-
vitude, which ought to be securing a perpetual benefit for my es-
tate.  Moreover, (2) if a third person had disturbed me in the use 
of my servitude, or prevented my use of the property, my claim 
would have had to be directed, not against the man disturbing me, 
but against the owner of the estate, and only then would the 
owner have been obliged to bring a claim against the man disturb-
ing me, or cede the claim to me. 
  Therefore lest anyone be deprived indirectly of the benefit ac-
cruing to his estate, and so that he could enjoy the benefit in per-
petuity, the Roman legislators162 gave a real action to the domi-
nant estate and its possessor, so that he could assert his 
ownership of the servitude from any possessor whatsoever.  And 
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therefore they also demand something like tradition (because a 
real right is created only by tradition), but they regard actual use, 
or forbearance by the owner, as the equivalent of tradition163. 
  That this arrangement is merely civil is made clear by (1) the 
legal requirements, failing which a personal action remains.  For 
(2) a servitude which is established for two estates which are not 
close to one another gives rise to a mere personal action.  The 
same is true of (3) servitudes which do not benefit my estate, for 
example if I agree with the owner next door that he shall not go 
across his own land, or not remain there; that he shall not enjoy 
his own land; that he shall not obtain water from his own land; 
that he shall not remove trees, a removal which would make his 
property the more pleasant for my view164; etc.  The same is also 
true of an agreement allowing one to stroll, dine, or gather fruit 
on a neighbouring property.  Moreover, (4) a mere personal action 
is granted to me if the servitude is not aimed at securing some-
thing in perpetuity.  But (5) if a servitude, that is to say a right of 
obtaining a benefit in the estate of another, had by nature given 
one some right in the thing itself, the right would have extended 
to non-neighbouring estates, even if the estate did not enjoy a 
perpetual benefit. 
§ 305.  II.)  In the case of personal servitudes the reasoning of the 
civil law is equally apparent.  For (1) in only four cases did the 
Roman Jurists include the use of another's property in the cate-
gory of real rights: (a) in usufruct, where the usufruct (i.e., the 
right to use, and to the fruits of, the property of another, but not 
the substance) is granted by agreement to someone; or whenever 
things which are consumed by use are given to the user on the 
condition that a thing of the same kind, or its equivalent, is re-
stored, a transaction which is called 'quasi-usufruct' (where a cau-
tio is given for the property which, because of the nature of the 
thing, cannot be preserved);  (b) in usus, where a person is al-
lowed, for ordinary needs, the right to use, and to the fruits of, the 
                                                                                                                                   
163  In the cited passage (D.8.1.20) Javolenus expresses the opinion 
that the exercise of the right should be regarded as the equivalent to tra-
dition of possession. 
164  The last of these examples is confused; in the cited passage, 
Pomponius has left off speaking about the issue of 'benefit', and is now 
addressing servitudes which attempt to make the servient owner do 
something (such as remove trees).  Cocceji seems to believe Pomponius is 
still talking about 'benefit' and, in an effort to force the example to make 
sense, has given the very contrived example of a servitude not to remove 
trees, where the removal would effect a benefit to the neighbouring prop-
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property of another, but not the substance;  (c) in habitatio, where 
not the entire usufruct in a building, but only that part which 
constitutes occupancy, is granted;  (d) in opera servorum, where 
similarly not the usufruct of the whole slave, but that part which 
constitutes daywork, is granted to someone. 
In all of the remaining cases there is but a personal action, as 
when one is granted the use of another's thing gratuitously by 
commodatum; similarly when the use of a thing is transferred to 
another for a charge by locatio; further, when one is allowed by 
agreement to pick the fruit in the neighbouring garden, etc. 
Therefore because (2) it was decided that in only four specific 
cases a real action would be given, and not in others (though the 
same natural-law reasoning obtains there), these very exceptions 
show that this arrangement is merely civil.  The reason, more-
over, why (3) the Roman Jurists classified those four cases as real 
rights appears to be the same as in the case of real servitudes: in 
this kind of agreement, too, a kind of perpetual benefit is trans-
ferred to the user (by its very nature ended only by death), a bene-
fit which the owner of the thing is able indirectly to spoil for the 
fructuary by selling the thing (for the buyer is not bound by the 
agreement of his predecessor), in which event only a personal ac-
tion, for the amount the matter is worth, remains to the fructu-
ary.  Yet even if some third person should impede that fructuary, 
he would be obliged to sue only the owner of the thing, the owner 
then being obliged to sue the one disturbing the fructuary.  The 
Roman legislators got rid of this merry-go-round by giving a real 
action to the possessor of the servitude. 
It was clearly for these reasons of utility that the Roman ju-
rists extended the idea of real rights to other causes.  This is the 
very reason why the conductor or buyer of a superficies is given a 
real action if he builds, plants, or otherwise installs something on 
the property.  For if anyone was disturbed in the use of a superfi-
cies, he was required to sue the owner by a personal actio ex con-
ducto or ex empto, and the owner was required to cede his actions 
[against the one disturbing] to the superficiary, but to offer an ac-
tion quasi in rem seemed much more useful (because it is better to 
be in possession than to undertake a personal action165), and in 
fact the Praetor subsequently gave a real action.  Accordingly, by 
natural law the conductor or buyer does not have a real right in 
the superficies (indeed by natural law the superficies cedes to the 
                                                                                                                                   
165 Cocceji's  possidere makes more sense with the knowledge that, 
in his source, an interdict is under discussion.  See D.43.18.1.1 (Ulp. 70 
ed.): Sed longe utile visum est, . . . quia melius est possidere potius quam 
in personam experiri, hoc interdictum proponere et quasi in rem actionem 
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land), but in each case the Praetor gives a real action for the rea-
sons cited. 
What is more, they [sc. the Roman Jurists] included em-
phyteusis, which is simply a perpetual hire, among the class of 
real rights, and they declared it a kind of ownership, lest the 
owner take it upon himself to subvert that perpetual use by trans-
fer, and lest the fructuary have the task of recovering his use by a 
circuit of actions. 
So for the same reasons, real actions were permitted for the 
vindication of servitudes; they are of course the actiones confes-
soria and negatoria. 